





























Andrew D. Henderson, Supervisor 
Craig Crossland 
Pamela R. Haunschild 
Andrew A. King 












Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 











This research would not have been possible without the help of a number of 
individuals, both inside and outside of academia.  First and foremost I would like to thank 
my family, and especially my wife Lydia, for sticking with me throughout this journey.  
Without your support I would not have been able to achieve this accomplishment.  I 
would like to thank my committee chair Andy Henderson.  Andy’s patience, support and 
guidance throughout this process have been invaluable.  All the members of my 
dissertation committee: Craig Crossland, Pamela Haunschild, Andrew King and 
Francisco Polidoro have also been tremendously helpful in the development of the ideas 
herein.  Finally, I would like to thank the Herb Kelleher Center for Entrepreneurship at 





Bruce Coleman Rudy, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2011 
 
Supervisor:  Andrew D. Henderson 
 
Firms are believed to engage in strategic political management (SPM) in attempts 
to shape public policy in favorable ways and enhance their economic returns.  Extant 
research has broadly considered the motivations leading to corporate political activity, 
focusing on the effects of market power using metrics such as firm size and industry 
concentration to investigate this phenomenon.  More recently, scholars have proposed a 
more nuanced perspective on the subject, suggesting that different types of SPM may 
exist.  For example, both Baysinger (1984) and Oliver and Holzinger (2008) have 
distinguished between corporate political strategies designed to maintain or alter the 
firm’s political environment.  In this study, I seek to more critically explore this 
distinction.  I propose that at least two different types of SPM exist: defensive SPM, 
which is directed at protecting existing competitive advantage, and offensive SPM, which 
is focused on creating new forms of competitive advantage.  I further propose that the 
threats and opportunities in a firm’s regulatory environment are important motivators of 
these different types of SPM.  In the context of the natural gas industry in Texas from 
1999-2009, I find that the degree of regulatory uncertainty in the firm’s political 
environment influences it to engage in defensive SPM.  I also find that the size of the 
firm’s asset inventory influences it to engage in offensive SPM.  Furthermore, I find that 
 vi
regulatory uncertainty negatively moderates the relationship between the size of a firm’s 
asset inventory and its likelihood of investing in offensive SPM. 
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A firm’s environment can be defined as having both market and non-market 
components.  The market environment consists of a firm’s competitors, suppliers, and 
customers that interact voluntarily through transactions (Baron, 1995).  The non-market 
environment, “a greatly neglected source of organizational power and change” (Fligstein, 
1987: 45), consists of the state and is responsible for establishing formal political and 
judicial rules which define and facilitate the exchange of property rights in markets 
(North, 1990) as well as regulate the operations of firms.  Strategy research has 
predominately taken a market perspective, focusing on the actions firms take in this arena 
to maximize economic returns.  However, Fligstein (1987: 45) argues that “The state 
regulates organizations in a number of ways, and organizations also control the activities 
of the state.”  Indeed, recent empirical studies indicate that organizations enjoy 
significant returns when their efforts to influence the state are successful.  For example, 
de Figueiredo & Silverman (2006) found that universities in states represented by a 
member of the House Appropriations Committee or Senate Appropriations Committee 
received $4.52 and $5.24 respectively, for every $1 invested in lobbying.  Similarly, in a 
study of firms that lobbied for a tax holiday on repatriated earnings created by the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Alexander, Scholz, & Mazza (2009), found that 
firms received $220 per $1 spent on lobbying.  These findings suggest that the nonmarket 
environment can be lucrative, providing firms an alternative path to maximize economic 
returns. 
Despite the fact that recent research indicates that returns to strategic political 
management can be significant, firms vary in how much and when they invest.  Perhaps 
more importantly, little is known about what motivates firms to make such an investment.  
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Political scientists and economists have approached the question of motivation, but 
focused on the industry as their level of analysis, arguing that firms and their industries 
represent interest groups (Epstein, 1980) and that their influence on public policy should 
be expected to be significant (Lowi, 1969).  In political economics, Stigler’s (1971) 
theory of economic regulation has formed much of the theoretical basis for industry-state 
interaction, arguing that political activity is engaged in by industry to gain benefit via 
government subsidies and influence over market entry, prices, and the rules that 
determine product substitutes.  He further argued that public policy is designed for 
industry's benefit and all industries with sufficient political power will seek to manipulate 
the state in hopes of gaining governmental favors (Stigler, 1971).  These arguments have 
been foundational in providing a set of expectations regarding industry-state interactions, 
yet such arguments do not consider the possibility that firms embody different, and 
possibly unique, motivations that lead them to engage the state at different times and in 
different ways. 
Scholars in strategic management have taken an alternative approach in studying 
the relationship between the firm and the state.  Research from this perspective has 
produced a descriptive inventory of the various political tactics, such as lobbying, 
advocacy advertising, constituency building, financial contributions, and coalition 
formation that firms undertake to manage their political environment (Bonardi, Hillman 
& Keim, 2005; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004).  Strategy research has also 
identified several possible antecedents leading firms to engage the government, such as 
firm size (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Schuler, Rhebein & Cramer, 2002), firm age 
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Hitt, 1999), and organizational slack (Meznar & 
Nigh, 1995), but with the exception of firm size, which has been shown to have a positive 
effect on a firm’s likelihood of engaging the state, the results of these studies have been 
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mixed.  Thus, while strategy scholars have focused on firm motivations to engage in 
political activity, research has yet to yield conclusions inconsistent with Stigler’s early 
arguments linking corporate political activity to firm size. 
A key insight from extant research in strategic management is that organizations 
differ in ways other than size (Barney, 1991; Moran & Ghosal, 1999; Penrose, 1959).  
Indeed, strategy scholars have emphasized the importance of the context in which firms 
operate as a key criterion motivating particular actions (Burgelman, 1983; Hambrick & 
MacMillan, 1985).  More specifically, strategic categorization research has suggested that 
managers respond differently when they perceive the environment to pose threats or 
represent opportunities.  For example, perceived threats tend to cause managers to restrict 
the amount of information they attend to and the solutions they consider (Billings, 
Milbum, & Schaalman, 1980; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).  In comparison, 
perceived opportunities can result in more open information searching and in more 
straightforward appraisal processes (Nutt, 1984).   
Employing ideas from the strategic categorization literature to corporate political 
activity suggests that there may be more than one motivation driving firms to engage in 
political action.  Indeed, to the extent that there are threats in a firm’s political 
environment, we may expect it to engage in corporate political activity that attempts to 
protect it from such threats.  In contrast, to the extent that opportunities exist in the 
political environment, a different set of political actions focused on capturing such 
opportunities may ensue.  The research presented here seeks to explore the possibility 
that different motivations drive firms to engage in different types of political actions by 
addressing the research question: What influences firms to engage in political activity and 
what drives different types of corporate political behavior? 
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CONTRIBUTION 
My thesis seeks to contribute to research in strategic management in three ways.  
First, I theoretically differentiate between different types of strategic political 
management based on contextual motivations.  The notion that different types of strategic 
political management exist has been proposed by scholars that study the interaction of 
business and government.  For example, Baysinger (1984) distinguished between (a) 
domain maintenance, in which a firm engages in politics to deal with threats to the way it 
pursues its goals, and (b) domain management, which occurs when firms engage in 
politics to gain special monetary opportunities at the expense of other interests.  More 
recently, Oliver and Holzinger (2008) distinguished between defensive political strategies 
designed to thwart unwanted political changes and proactive political strategies focused 
on shaping the way norms and public policies are defined.  However, despite identifying 
potentially different types of corporate political activity, research has yet to consider the 
conditions under which firms would be expected to engage in one or the other.  I propose 
specific environmental conditions and firm-level motivations that would be expected to 
lead to different types of strategic political management. 
Second, I seek to extend strategic categorization theory.  Prior research using 
strategic categorization theory has suggested that when faced with threats or 
opportunities, firms either take (a) actions internal to the firm, such as reworking 
routines, or (b) market oriented activities, such as expanding products into new markets 
(Chattopadhyay, Glick & Huber, 2001).  I argue that when faced with threats or 
opportunities, firms may also engage in political activity to protect or create advantage.  
Thus, I propose that strategic categorization theory also applies to actions that firms take 
beyond their boundaries or within the market in which they compete.  I argue that under 
certain circumstances, how a firm perceives the threats and opportunities within its 
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environment, can lead it to engage in political activity to shape the rules that govern its 
operations. 
Third, I develop a methodology which empirically assesses two types of strategic 
political management: defensive and offensive.  No research that I am aware of has 
attempted to empirically assess this potentially important distinction.  Methodologically 
assessing different types of corporate political activity is likely to be important to 
research in non-market strategy because it will allow strategy scholars to more readily 
apply existing firm-level theory to the political actions that firms take. 
This research proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a review of (a) the 
literature on why firms engage in strategic political management from the perspective of 
strategic management, organizational theory and political science/economics and (b) 
research that has developed different strategic typologies of corporate political activity.  
Chapter 3 extends strategic categorization theory to develop testable hypotheses by 
relating ideas about how firms respond to threats and opportunities in their political 
environment by engaging in strategic political management.  Chapter 4 provides the 
methodology employed to test the proposed hypotheses.  Chapter 5 shows the results of 
the study.  Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the results and future research directions. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The following literature review of strategic political management is divided into 
two sections: prior research that considers the motivations why firm engage in political 
activity and prior research that has developed different strategic typologies of corporate 
political activity.  Within the section on motivation for corporate political action, three 
perspectives are assessed: strategic management, organizational theory and political 
science/economics.  Summary tables of the literature’s reviewed for both sections are 
provided in Tables 1 and 2. 
FIRM MOTIVATIONS TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE.  Research in strategic management on 
corporate political behavior has been termed strategic political management (Oliver & 
Holzinger, 2008), corporate political activity (Baysinger, 1984) and non-market strategy 
(Baron, 1995).  Strategic political management (SPM) is defined as “the set of strategic 
actions that firms plan and enact for the purpose of maximizing economic returns from 
the political environment” (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008: 496).  Corporate political activity 
is described as corporate attempts to shape public policy in ways favorable to the firm 
(Baysinger, 1984).  Non-market strategy is defined as a “concerted pattern of actions 
taken in the non-market environment to create value by improving its overall 
performance” (Baron, 1995: 47).  Going forward, I use the term SPM to describe a firm’s 
political behavior. 
Strategic management research has considered why firms might be expected to 
engage in SPM, focusing primarily on the firm-level motivations that lead organizations 
to engage the state (Getz, 1997; Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  Scholars have proposed that 
firms undertake SPM for a variety of reasons, including to: alert the government to their 
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interests (Keim & Baysinger, 1988), decrease their dependence on the state (Getz, 1993), 
gain access to state-owned resources (Hillman, 2003), shape public policy (Keim & 
Zeithaml, 1986), halt undesirable regulation (Yoffie, 1987), and lower costs (Kaufman, 
Englander, & Marcus, 1993). 
To empirically assess why firms engage the state, strategy scholars have 
considered a variety of firm characteristics that could lead to investment in SPM.  The 
most popular antecedent in the management literature has been firm size, with larger 
firms expected to be more politically active (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Keim & 
Baysinger, 1988).  Similar to political economists who have assumed that firm size 
equates to political power (Oster, 1982), strategy scholars have typically argued that firm 
size acts as a proxy for resources and therefore larger firms should be more capable of 
engaging the state than smaller firms (Epstein, 1980; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997, Yoffie, 
1987).  Empirically, firm size has been measured in terms of sales (Schuler et al., 2002), 
assets (Meznar & Nigh, 1995), market share (Schuler, 1996), and number of employees 
(Meznar & Nigh, 1995).  Furthermore, firm size has been shown to be positively 
associated with SPM in a variety of industries, such as: wood products, electronics, steel, 
and petroleum (Salamon & Siegfried, 1977; Schuler, 1996; Ungson, James, & Spicer, 
1985). 
Firm slack has also been used to predict SPM (Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Schuler, 
1996; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997; Schuler et al., 2002).  The primary argument for slack as 
a driver of SPM has been that firms with greater uncommitted resources would be more 
active in the political arena because they could afford to do so.  This relationship was 
empirically demonstrated by Meznar and Nigh (1995), though it has not been found 
consistently (e.g., Schuler, 1996; Schuler et al., 2002).  Additionally, firm age has also 
been linked to investment in SPM.  Scholars have argued that firm age should be 
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interpreted as a proxy for the firm’s reputation (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994) or its 
experience (Hillman & Hitt, 1999) and could therefore be associated with greater 
amounts of SPM.  However, empirical research has yet to confirm these arguments. 
More recently, strategy scholars have begun to look within the firm to better 
understand why certain companies engage in SPM.  For example, Cook and Barry 
(1995), in a study of small firms’ SPM, noted the importance of managerial cognition in 
driving firms to engage the state.  Burris (2001) investigated the political contribution 
patterns of firms and their top managers, finding that the two were not related.  In fact, 
managers appeared to be more willing to attempt to alter the makeup of Congress by 
acting as individuals outside of the firm than as corporate actors responsible to the 
demands of stakeholders.  Still other studies have taken an upper echelons perspective 
arguing that firms with board of directors that have prior government experience should 
be expected to provide unique access between the firm and policy makers (e.g., Hillman, 
2005; Lester et al., 2008).  These studies found a positive relationship between board‘s 
with prior government experience and likelihood of future SPM and have provided 
important initial insights into the influence of corporate leadership on a firm’s likelihood 
of engaging in SPM. 
In summary, prior strategic management research on the use of SPM by firms 
suggests that it can be motivated by a variety of factors.  Extant research has considered a 
number of firm-level characteristics that could predict the likelihood of a firm engaging 
in SPM, though only firm size has provided consistent results in this regard.  
Nevertheless, strategy research has generated some important conceptual insights 
regarding firm-level antecedents that might lead to SPM which, in turn, provides the 
theoretical and empirical starting point on which this research is based.  Furthermore, the 
variables that prior research in strategy has posited as potentially influential in motivating 
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firm SPM are included as controls in this study, where appropriate, to minimize the 
number of alternative explanations for the results. 
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY PERSPECTIVE.  Organizational theorists have also 
considered the question of motivation to invest in strategic political management, 
primarily from the institutional and resource dependence perspectives, though social 
network and stakeholder management theory have also been applied.  Institutional 
theorists have typically emphasized the survival value of conformity with the institutional 
environment and the benefits of adhering to external rules and norms (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  However, this research has also suggested that 
firms might seek to manipulate external rules and norms to which they are expected to 
conform (DiMaggio, 1983; Scott, 1983).  Moreover, Oliver (1991) explicitly suggests 
that organizations may engage in political influence tactics, such as lobbying, to redefine 
the institutional rules to which they are required to conform.   
Resource dependence theory has also been applied to the question of corporate 
political activity motivation by emphasizing the organizational necessity of adapting to 
environmental uncertainty.  This perspective has considered a wide range of behaviors 
that organizations engage in to exert influence over the allocation of critical resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Scott, 1987; Thompson, 1967).  For example, prior research 
suggests that firms dependent on the government for key resources would be more likely 
to engage in political activity to manage such critical dependencies (Hillman & Hitt, 
1999; Meznar & Nigh, 1995).  To test this notion, research has argued that firms with a 
high proportion of sales to or contracts with the federal government (e.g., defense 
contracts), or with heavy cost burdens imposed from public policy (Hillman et al., 2004), 
would be likely to engage in political action to shape public policy (Hansen & Mitchell, 
2000; Hart, 2001; Schuler, 1999; Schuler et al., 2002).  Further, Martin (1995) and 
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Schuler (1999) included a firm’s percentage of exports, to capture government 
dependence, as a determinant of corporate political activity in their studies. 
Research from a social network perspective has also considered why firms engage 
the state.  Useem (1984) and Mizruchi (1992) suggested that formal and informal 
institutions bind elites from business and government together.  Therefore, firms more 
central in these networks would be more likely to be actively involved in political 
activities.  Broadbent (2000) tested this notion, finding that centrality in networks among 
business, labor, and government in Japan tended to result in consensus on the promotion 
of future policy agendas. 
Research from stakeholder management theory has examined the entire set of 
environmental and interest group pressures exerted on firms by the media, public opinion, 
consumers, advocacy groups, employees, shareholders, and government.  This research 
has emphasized the importance of political issues to a given company as a key motivator 
of political strategy (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997; Vogel, 1996).  Similar to resource 
dependence theory, stakeholder management theory has tended to focus on the 
importance of a political issue to a firm as a function of the firm’s dependence on the 
stakeholder, in this case the government (Freeman, 1984). 
In summary, organizational theorists have considered the reasons why firms 
engage in strategic political management from a variety of perspectives.  Scholars have 
employed institutional theory to suggest that firms predominately conform to the coercive 
institutional forces from the government, yet, at times may also engage the state and act 
as agents of institutional change.  Resource dependence theory has been employed to 
explain this phenomenon as well, suggesting that those firms with critical 
interdependencies with the government would be expected to be more likely to engage in 
political activity.  Social network theorists have argued that elites within corporations and 
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government should be expected to be cohesive and thus the structure of corporate 
political activity should be related to the centrality of the corporation within the firm-
government network.  Finally, similar to resource dependence theory, stakeholder 
management theory has argued that the government represents yet another stakeholder 
influencing firms and predicts conditions under which firms would be likely to engage 
the state. 
POLITICAL SCIENCE/ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE.  Scholars from political science 
and political economics have, in general, posited two distinct motivations for why firms 
might engage in political activity.  A popular theory from this field is the regulatory 
capture perspective which argues that firms, especially large ones, engage the state to 
capture regulatory power, and should be expected to benefit at the expense of the 
collective interests of the public (Olson, 1965; Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971).  In 
contrast, the neopluralist theory posited by other scholars from this field argues that firms 
engage in political activity when they are in trouble or threatened (Gray & Lowery, 1996; 
Salisbury, 1984; Truman, 1951).  Neopluralists have made important contributions to this 
area of study and the majority of their arguments are consistent with ideas from resource 
dependence theory which was reviewed above.  Thus, the regulatory capture perspective 
is the focus of this section. 
The basis for much of the regulatory capture argument on firm-state interactions 
stems from George Stigler’s foundational work on the theory of economic regulation.  
Within this theory, Stigler (1971) proposed that interest groups and other political 
participants can acquire or capture political activity.  More specifically, he argued that 
because industry tends to represent the most powerful political participants in the 
economy, it would be more likely to capture the regulatory and coercive powers of 
government in ways beneficial to it.  Examples of regulatory capture outcomes include 
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direct subsidies and laws affecting industry entry barriers and prices.  Taken to its 
extreme, Stigler’s theory suggests consumers would consistently lose out to industry as it 
is better organized and more capable of deploying its greater resources than more 
fragmented consumer groups, yet anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not always the 
case.  To rectify this shortcoming, Peltzman (1976) expanded on this theory by giving 
equal attention to the supply of regulation; the motivations that drive regulators to 
generate regulations that benefit consumers even though industry is capable of lobbying 
more effectively.  Becker (1983) further contributed to this stream of research by 
developing a model of competition between interest groups which argued that the amount 
of pressure that an interest group applies to an issue, relative to other interest groups, is 
directly related to its success in gaining favorable policy outcomes. 
The research that has followed from these foundational works has assumed that 
firms and legislators operate in a market environment in which firms provide voters and 
political contributions in exchange for favorable public policy, thereby maximizing 
respective self-interests (Shaffer, 1995).  Thus, the state is not viewed as an exogenous 
force influencing industry, but rather an endogenous component of the economic system.  
Stiglerian political economists therefore argue that the purpose of public policy is to act 
as a mechanism which transfers favors that are demanded by industry and supplied by 
policy makers (Caeldries, 1996).  This argument stems directly from Stigler’s (1971) 
theory that public policy is designed for industry’s benefit, and any industry with 
sufficient political power will seek to manipulate policy to gain advantage.  Empirically, 
Stigler (1971) provided a case study to support this hypothesis but surprisingly little 
empirical work since has attempted to test the theory.   
Consistent with the regulatory capture perspective, political scientists have also 
argued that public policy occurs as a result of competing demands amongst interest 
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groups (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998).  Firms are viewed as an interest group and it is 
argued that they work together as a collective to secure specific interests (Epstein, 1969; 
Francis, 1993).  As a result, the possibility exists that firms could undermine public 
interests and democratic processes (Lowi, 1969).  Recently, debate amongst these 
scholars has questioned the degree to which firms should be considered interest groups 
(Hart, 2004).  Interest group theory assumes a voluntary association of citizens who seek 
to influence public policy for some greater good (Olson, 1965).  Scholars have argued 
that firms do not represent a voluntary association of individuals and, instead, firms seek 
to influence policy decisions to maximize profits and as such should not be considered 
interest groups (Hart, 2004; Salisbury, 1984).  While this debate continues, the majority 
of research from this perspective has taken an industry-level view of firms.  As a result of 
this aggregation to the industry level, these scholars have not addressed public policy 
outcomes from the perspective of individual firms or the possibility that firms may 
increase profitability or gain an advantage over rivals through their influence on policy-
makers (Shaffer, 1995). 
In summary, political economists and political scientists have taken a rational-
maximizing perspective regarding why firms attempt to influence the state and why 
policy makers would be expected to respond to such influence attempts.  Firm size is 
assumed to equate to political power, yet these scholars have tended to treat business as a 
single coalition (Oster, 1982), focusing instead on the challenges firms face in acting 
collectively within their industry (Olson, 1965).  Political economists have not focused on 
the possibility that firms may compete over specific legislative outcomes or that 
individual firms would seek to gain competitive advantages through strategic political 
management (Hersch & McDougall, 2000).  Thus, while political economics and political 
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science offers an industry-level perspective on firm-state interaction, it yields little insight 
into how firms may differentially seek to influence the policy-making environment. 
Beyond this variety of perspectives concerning corporate motivations to engage in 
SPM, extant research in strategic management has also proposed a number of typologies 
of SPM.  Because the research presented here focuses on the role of contextual drivers 
motivating firms to engage in different types of SPM, it is important to provide 
background on how existing research has distinguished between these different types of 
SPM.  A review of these typologies follows.  
TYPOLOGIES OF STRATEGIC POLITICAL MANAGEMENT 
In addition to considering questions of firm motivations to engage in corporate 
political behavior, past research has also attempted to characterize different typologies of 
SPM.  Extant typologies of SPM have predominately focused on the expected outcomes 
associated with different characterizations of SPM.  For example, Baysinger (1984) 
characterized three types of SPM: domain management, domain defense and domain 
maintenance.  Domain management is said to occur when firms seek to gain special 
monetary and anticompetitive favors from government at the expense of other firms or 
interests.  In domain management, political tactics are developed and implemented to 
induce governmental organizations to use their power on behalf of the firm, creating a 
cooperative relationship between governmental entities and business firms.  In domain 
defense, firms seek to manage environmental turbulence caused by organizational goals 
adversely impacting societal third parties.  Such environmental turbulence may result in 
governmental threats to the legitimacy of the firm’s strategic goals.  Thus, domain 
defense comprises a set of business political activities which are aimed at counteracting 
such challenges to its goals.  In domain maintenance, firms seek to manage threats to the 
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ways in it pursues the strategic goals.  Domain maintenance is similar to domain defense, 
but focuses on threats to the legitimacy of organizational methods, regardless of the 
perceived legitimacy of its goals and purposes. 
Weidenbaum (1980) differentiated between three types of corporate political 
activity: passive reaction, positive anticipation and public policy shaping.  Passive 
reaction strategies occur when firms make no attempt to play a role in policy formulation 
or implementation, focusing instead on reacting post hoc to new legislation.  Positive 
anticipation strategies occur when firms take a more active stance towards public policy 
but don’t participate in the policy making process, rather choosing to attempt to factor the 
influence of government policy into the strategic planning process.  Using this strategy, 
firms try to anticipate future regulations and make adjustments accordingly in their 
strategies, thus attempting to turn regulations into business opportunities.  Finally, public 
policy shaping entails proactive corporate political behavior focused on achieving 
specific political objectives. 
Yoffie (1987) created perhaps the most comprehensive typology of corporate 
political strategies differentiating between the actions of free riders, followers, leaders, 
private good firms and political entrepreneurs.  Free rider strategies are based off of 
collective action theory, which suggests that given nearly perfect information firms 
would be expected to free ride and enjoy the benefits of the collective actions of others 
(Olson, 1965).  Firms are expected to free ride when political issues have low salience 
and resources that the organization can commit to political action are limited.  Follower 
strategies occur when firms do not take the lead in collective organizations, but are 
willing to participate in collective action because they perceive the strategic benefit of 
favorable public policy for the firm.  In contrast, leader strategies occur when firms take 
the lead in organizing collective action and are likely to occur when firms hold a 
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dominant position in the industry and therefore have a large stake in the politics that 
influence the industry resulting in the individual benefit to organizing a collective effort 
to outweigh the costs.  Firms acting in a leadership capacity would be expected to be 
more effective when the industry as a whole can agree upon the hierarchy of important 
issues affecting them.  Additionally, leadership is thought to become more difficult when 
there is uncertainty about future regulations and whether they will differentially affect 
firms within the industry.   
Private goods strategies seek legislation, court decisions, regulations, executive 
orders, or other government assistance conferring unique benefits to an individual 
company.  Large and monopolistic firms are expected to try to undertake this strategy, 
but due to public disclosure, one firm gaining unique benefits from government is argued 
to be difficult.  Finally, political entrepreneur strategies occur when a firm uses resources 
to mobilize ad hoc coalitions of other companies and individuals with an eye towards 
securing access to key decision makers for the firm, but without the costs and risks of a 
private goods strategy and without the costs and constraints of organizing and leading a 
formal interest group. 
Moving forward in time, Meznar and Nigh (1995) differentiated between two 
types of SPM: buffering and bridging.  They defined buffering strategies as those focused 
on trying to keep the environment from interfering with internal operations and trying to 
influence the external environment.  Buffering implies that a firm is trying either to 
insulate itself from external interference or to actively influence its environment through 
such means as contributions to political action committees, lobbying, and advocacy 
advertising.  In contrast, bridging strategies occur when firms seek to adapt 
organizational activities so that they conform to external expectations.  Bridging implies 
that the firm is actively trying to meet and exceed regulatory requirements in its industry 
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or that it is attempting to quickly identify changing social expectations in order to 
promote organizational conformance to those expectations.  It is important to note that as 
conceived by Meznar and Nigh (1995), buffering and bridging strategies are not mutually 
exclusive and both are expected to occur with increasing environmental uncertainty. 
Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) offered a slightly different perspective when 
creating their typology of SPM.  They first defined non-bargaining political behavior as 
occurring when firms do not engage the government and bargaining political behavior as 
occurring when firms do engage the state.  Within bargaining political behavior, they 
further characterized conflict strategies and partnership intensity strategies.  Conflict 
strategies are implemented when governments attempt to appropriate the rents resulting 
from a firm’s operations.  Firms are expected to take political actions to re-appropriate 
these gains or generate new ones.  Partnership intensity strategies occur when firms seek 
to create formal or informal partnerships with the government in an effort to shift (a) 
from spot transactions to futures relationships, (b) from conflict to cooperation, (c) from 
dependence to interdependence, and (d) from opportunism to trust (Gambetta, 1988). 
Recently, Oliver and Holzinger (2008) have created yet another typology of SPM.  
First, these scholars differentiated between compliance and influence strategies.  
Compliance strategies occur when firms undertake actions to conform with political 
requirements and expectations for the purpose of maintaining or creating value by 
anticipating or adapting to public policy.  Influence strategies, on the other hand, occur 
when firms engage in political activity to mobilize support for specific interests. 
Compliance strategies are further differentiated into reactive political strategies 
and anticipatory political strategies.  Reactive political strategies are actions undertaken 
to align a firm’s internal processes with political demands whereas anticipatory political 
strategies are actions undertaken to gain a first mover advantage by anticipating future 
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public policy (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008).  Influence strategies are further differentiated 
into defensive and proactive political strategies.  Defensive political strategies are 
corporate political actions undertaken to thwart unwanted political changes and protect 
the status quo whereas proactive political strategies occur when firms seek to shape and 
control the way norms and public policies are defined. 
CONCLUSION 
In review, research on firm motivation to engage in corporate political activity 
suggests that firms engage the government because they: (a) are large and have the 
resources to undertake such a strategy (political economics-transaction theorists and 
recent empirical strategic management), (b) are dependent upon the state, in trouble or  
threatened and need to react (political economics-neopluralists, institutional and resource 
dependence theory), or (c) possess unique capabilities or connections to the state which 
provide them a competitive advantage (recent theoretical strategic management research).  
Furthermore, while prior work has suggested a variety of typologies of SPM, it has 
focused predominately on the goals and expected outcomes associated with each strategy 
type ignoring the role of contextual factors motivating different types of strategies.  As a 
result, prior work does not provide a great deal of insight into how contextual factors may 
influence when a firm would be expected to engage in different types of SPM.  Such a 
distinction is likely to matter because research has established that decision makers 
behave differently in contexts of perceived threats and opportunities (e.g., Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981) as well as 
when they are focused on recouping losses versus preserving gains (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  This strategic categorization of threats and opportunities and how it 
influences firms to engage in different types of SPM is explored next. 
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Chapter 3: Theory Development 
As described in chapter 2, scholars have theorized about different typologies of 
SPM.  While prior research has proposed different types of SPM (e.g., Baysinger, 1984; 
Oliver & Holzinger, 2008), research has yet to consider the conditions under which firms 
would be expected to engage in one type or another, and specifically, when those actions 
are likely to be offensive or defensive in nature.  Such a distinction is likely to matter 
because (1) research has found that decision makers behave differently under conditions 
of perceived threats and opportunities (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 
1988; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981) as well as when they are focused on recouping 
losses versus preserving gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and (2) as I argue below, 
distinctions of threats vs. opportunities and losses vs. gains are key to understanding how 
managers frame decisions about whether to engage the state in an offensive or defensive 
manner. 
Formally, I argue that defensive SPM occurs when firms engage in political 
activity to protect the value of existing resources from possible threats.  This may entail a 
firm lobbying for existing rules to remain in effect or for special loophole provisions to 
be added to new laws, the goal being to preserve a firm’s status quo.  In contrast, I argue 
that offensive SPM occurs when firms engage in political activity to create new 
opportunities for financial gain or competitive advantage.  For example, a firm may lobby 
to deregulate an industry for which it is well suited to compete but is currently prohibited 
from entering.  These definitions of defensive and offensive SPM are distinct from 
previously proposed types as they focus on the context and decision framing that guides 
firms to engage in SPM (i.e., threats and opportunities) rather than the expected outcomes 
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of such actions (e.g., Baysinger, 1984) or the reasons why such action may be effective 
(e.g., Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). 
There are likely to be a number of contextual factors that would motivate firms to 
engage in offensive or defensive SPM.  The intent of this research is not to provide a 
comprehensive listing of such factors, but rather to explore some factors that might 
influence firms to engage in different types of SPM.  This, in turn, will validate that 
different types of SPM exist and are influenced by contextual factors.  Broadly, this 
research considers environmental and firm specific factors that could influence a firm to 
engage in defensive and offensive SPM.  The complete model described below and tested 
herein is presented in Figure 1. 
ENVIRONMENTAL DRIVERS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF SPM 
According to Milliken (1987), uncertainty can be defined in terms of the 
perceived inability of decision-makers to understand the direction in which an 
environment might be changing, the potential impact of those changes on the 
organization, and whether or not particular responses to the environment might be 
successful.  One form of environmental uncertainty that is likely to influence whether a 
firm engages in SPM is regulatory uncertainty.  Similar to Milliken’s (1987) definition of 
state uncertainty, regulatory uncertainty can be defined as the situation that occurs when 
managers do not feel confident that they understand what the major events or trends in 
the political environment are or they feel unable to accurately assign probabilities to the 
likelihood that particular events or changes will occur (Milliken, 1987).  The effects of 
regulatory uncertainty have been argued by scholars to increase political activity among 
firms (e.g., Marcus, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), but research has yet to examine its 
influence on different types of corporate political behavior.  Additionally, regulatory 
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uncertainty is distinct from the degree of regulation within an industry, which refers to 
the extent to which a firm is regulated by a federal or state agency.  Industries can 
experience regulatory uncertainty regardless of whether they are highly regulated or not.  
For example, the natural gas exploration and production industry is highly regulated and 
is currently undergoing a high degree of regulatory uncertainty as states decide whether 
to create new legislation or increase existing regulations on unconventional gas well 
development in shale rock formations.  The computer industry, which is less regulated, 
has dealt with regulatory uncertainty in the recent past as state and federal governments 
have considered the issue of mandatory electronics recycling (Congressional Quarterly, 
2009). 
It is likely that regulatory uncertainty would be perceived negatively by firms.  
This is because increased operating costs and losses of management time accompany – or 
are at least perceived by executives to accompany – virtually all government actions, and 
hence almost any potential change in a firm’s regulatory environment, even one that 
eventually leads to less regulation, is likely to be perceived negatively by firms and their 
managers – until, that is, the law is set in stone and its interpretation is broadly agreed 
upon.  By its very nature, the legislative process involves numerous stakeholders with 
competing worldviews and conflicting ideologies; so regulatory outcomes are both 
uncertain and fraught with unintended consequences (Allison, 1969).  Thus, many 
executives will believe that any potential regulatory change could open Pandora’s Box.  
Given this, regulatory uncertainty is defined as an occurrence that stems from potential, 
unpredictable changes to a firm’s political environment.  This definition is conceptually 
similar to Miliken’s (1987) definition of state uncertainty in which a firm perceives its 
environment to be unpredictable. 
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Strategic categorization research has suggested that managers respond differently 
when they perceive the environment to pose threats or represent opportunities.  For 
example, perceived threats tend to cause managers to restrict the amount of information 
they attend to and the solutions they consider (Billings, Milbum, & Schaalman, 1980; 
Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).  In comparison, perceived opportunities can result in 
more open information searching and in more straightforward appraisal processes (Nutt, 
1984).  Jackson and Dutton (1988) found that threats have a negative connotation, are 
associated with feelings of lack of control and are likely to be attended to more readily by 
managers.  In contrast, they found that opportunities are positive issues, perceived as 
having a high potential for gain with only limited loss and are likely to be acted upon by 
managers in a more variable way.  Opportunities and threats, rather than being two ends 
of a single continuum, are therefore treated as distinct categories by managers when they 
make decisions (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret, 1976; 
Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981).  
High levels of regulatory uncertainty are likely to be perceived by a firm as a 
threat.  This is because firms have gained experience and understand how to operate in 
their current political environment, and any potential change to the way in which the 
government regulates that environment is likely to result in increased government 
scrutiny of the firm’s current operations.  This increased scrutiny, in turn, has the 
potential to threaten the firm’s underlying strategy.  Firms are therefore likely to be 
sensitive to the increased government scrutiny associated with regulatory uncertainty and 
act in a quick and decisive manner to protect their strategic position.  Resource 
dependence theory suggests that increasing uncertainty may lead to greater levels of 
corporate political activity (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Yet, in environments 
characterized by high levels of regulatory uncertainty, firms would be motivated to not 
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just invest in SPM, but more specifically to invest in defensive SPM.  We know that 
defensive SPM is particularly well suited for maintaining the status quo (Oliver & 
Holzinger, 2008).  As government scrutiny of business operations increases with 
increasing regulatory uncertainty, firms would therefore be expected to invest in SPM 
that is focused on protecting the firm’s strategic direction at risk to regulatory change.  
Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relationship between the degree of 
regulatory uncertainty and the extent of investment in defensive SPM. 
FIRM SPECIFIC DRIVERS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF SPM 
UNREALIZED GAINS FROM STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS.  So far I have focused on 
the environmental conditions under which a firm would be expected to engage in 
defensive SPM.  It is also likely that firm specific factors could influence how a firm 
might invest in SPM.  For instance, the more a firm has invested to take advantage of its 
existing competitive environment, the more it would rely on the rules governing its 
competitive environment to either remain unchanged or evolve in expected and foreseen 
ways.  This is because strategic planning and implementation by firms is a difficult and 
costly process that requires a firm to make specific assumptions about its abilities to 
create value as well as how its competitive environment might respond to such efforts 
(Mintzberg, 1978).  Furthermore, the returns to such strategic planning and the 
investment that follows are likely to be unrealized for some time (Kukalis, 1991).  Thus, 
firms that have yet to realize economic gains from their strategic investments would be 
particularly motivated to maintain the aspects of their competitive environment that were 
assumed to exist during the original strategic planning.  This idea is not dissimilar to the 
notion of a “sunk cost bias” in which prior research on individual and organizational 
decision making has shown that decision makers find it difficult to abandon a course of 
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action once they have made an initial commitment (Staw, 1976; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Arkes & Blumer, 1985).  Engaging in defensive SPM, which is principally focused 
on maintaining the status quo (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008), would therefore be an 
attractive strategy for firms to undertake. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a positive relationship between the amount a 
firm has invested in yet to be realized gains and the extent of its investment 
in defensive SPM. 
SIZE OF ASSET INVENTORY.  In contrast to firms that have invested significant 
amounts in strategic initiatives that have yet to generate economic returns, firms that have 
a large asset inventory would be likely to invest in offensive SPM.  This is because firms 
that have large asset inventories may face challenges with issues of underutilization 
(Teece, 1980; 1982).  Underutilization here refers to slack resources and not a latent 
inefficiency embodied by the firm.  Firms with a large inventory of assets that are not 
fully utilized are likely to search for opportunities under which they would be able to 
increase utilization rates.  While market-oriented strategies to increase utilization rates of 
assets might include entering new markets (Teece, 1980) or engaging in strategic 
alliances (Kogut, 1988), nonmarket strategies may also exist.  For example, scholars 
employing real options reasoning suggest that investments in SPM can be thought of as 
amplifying preinvestments aimed at shifting key legal boundaries and thus increasing the 
value of underlying assets (McGrath, 1997).  Thus, 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a positive relationship between the size of a 
firm’s asset inventory and the extent of its investment in offensive SPM. 
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THE MODERATING ROLE OF EXPERIENCE WITH SPM 
Research in strategic management has suggested that experience is directly related 
to an organization’s ability to learn (Levitt & March, 1988).  Consistent with this line of 
thinking, firms with experience engaging the state are more likely to utilize SPM than 
firms without such experience.  This notion stems from Venkataraman’s (1997) idea that 
a manager’s prior experience leads to the recognition of opportunities related to the 
information gained from such experiences.  Roberts (1991) also suggested that prior 
information, whether obtained from work experience, education, or other means, 
influences the manager’s ability to comprehend, extrapolate, interpret, and apply new 
information in ways that those lacking that prior information cannot replicate. 
This line of reasoning suggests that firms which have had experience engaging in 
SPM would be more likely to do so in the future.  Indeed, when firms are faced with 
environments characterized by high levels of regulatory uncertainty, those firms which 
have utilized SPM to manage such environments would be more likely to engage in SPM 
than firms that don’t have this experience.  This is because these firms would likely 
recognize the value of SPM in managing such high regulatory uncertainty environments.  
Also, these firms would likely have a more nuanced understanding of how to use SPM to 
manage such environments.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4: Prior experience with SPM will positively moderate the 
relationship between the degree of regulatory uncertainty and the extent of 
investment in defensive SPM. 
The relationship described in hypothesis 2 is also likely to be moderated by the 
amount of prior experience a firm has had engaging in SPM.  As argued, firms which 
have made strategic investments that have yet to generate a return are likely to engage in 
defensive SPM in an effort to maintain the status quo and increase the likelihood that 
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they will be able maximize the returns from their investments.  When firms have prior 
experience engaging in SPM, this relationship would be expected to be even stronger.  
Therefore, based on the same rationale suggested above: 
Hypothesis 5: Prior experience with SPM will positively moderate the 
relationship between the amount a firm has invested in yet to be realized 
gains and the extent of its investment in defensive SPM. 
The relationship described in hypothesis 3 is also likely to be moderated by the 
prior experience that a firm has had engaging in SPM.  As described above, prior 
experience has been found to positively influence the discovery of new opportunities 
(Shane, 2000).  Similarly, those firms with significant experience engaging in SPM 
would be expected to be more likely to engage in offensive SPM when they have a large 
asset inventory.  This is because firms with substantial asset bases may already be 
predisposed to engage in offensive SPM to shape future rules of their competitive 
environment to better utilize those assets.  Firms with such asset bases and prior 
experience with SPM would be even more likely to engage in offensive SPM because 
their prior SPM experience would help them better understand how to engage the state to 
generate new and beneficial rules.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 6: Prior experience with SPM will positively moderate the 
relationship between the size of a firm’s asset inventory and the extent of 
its investment in offensive SPM. 
THE MODERATING ROLE OF REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY 
The relationship described in hypothesis 2 is likely to be moderated by the degree 
of regulatory uncertainty in the firm’s environment.  As previously argued, environments 
characterized by high levels of regulatory uncertainty are expected to result in firms 
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engaging in defensive SPM.  This is because managers perceive the possibility of 
increased government scrutiny associated with regulatory uncertainty as a threat and 
engage in defensive SPM to protect existing competitive advantage.  When firms have 
invested capital in yet to be realized strategic outcomes, in environments characterized by 
high levels of regulatory uncertainty, their efforts to engage in defensive SPM are likely 
to be even greater.  This is because managers in these firms and environments will (a) 
perceive the regulatory uncertainty in the environment as a threat and (b) be under 
substantial pressure to make good on strategic investments that have yet to generate 
profitable returns.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 7: Higher levels of regulatory uncertainty will positively 
moderate the relationship between the amount a firm has invested in yet to 
be realized gains and the extent of its investment in defensive SPM. 
The relationship described in hypothesis 3 is also likely to be moderated by the 
degree of regulatory uncertainty in the firm’s environment.  Firms that have a large 
inventory of assets are expected to engage in offensive SPM in an effort to create new 
opportunities for demand of their assets.  However, as previously argued, environments 
characterized by high levels of regulatory uncertainty are expected to lead firms to 
engage in defensive SPM.  Therefore, when firms have a large inventory of assets but 
operate in environments characterized by high levels of regulatory uncertainty, their 
efforts to engage in offensive SPM would be expected to be weakened.  This is because 
managers in these firms and environments are likely to perceive the high level of 
regulatory uncertainty as a threat that supersedes their use of offensive SPM to create 
new ways of increasing the demand for the firm’s surplus asset base.  Thus, 
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Hypothesis 8: Higher levels of regulatory uncertainty will negatively 
moderate the relationship between the size of a firm’s asset inventory and 




The empirical setting for this study is the U.S. natural gas industry.  Between 
1999 and 2009, the natural gas industry underwent a significant change with the 
development and combination of cost effective technologies to extract natural gas from 
unconventional rock formations.  Horizontal drilling technologies were combined with 
hydraulic fracturing technologies which allowed firms to horizontally access and fracture 
these previously unproductive natural gas formations.  Traditionally, wells were drilled 
vertically and the gas producing formations were accessed along a much shorter length of 
drill casing.  Utilizing horizontal drilling technologies, firms were able to increase the 
surface area of the drill pipe within the natural gas formation.  Hydraulic fracturing 
technologies were then used to create fractures in the formation to increase the flow of 
natural gas. As a result of this combination of technological innovations, vast new 
deposits of natural gas locked within shale rock formations became productive across the 
United States.  The first major shale gas development began in Texas, the Barnett Shale, 
in 2002, and the largest projected shale gas deposit currently exists in the northeastern 
United States, the Marcellus Shale, where commercial development began in 2005. 
Recently, issues with the use of hydraulic fracturing have begun to arise.  
Complaints of groundwater contamination and air pollution have been reported near shale 
well developments and the Environmental Protection Agency has announced that it will 
be undertaking an environmental impact assessment of the use of hydraulic fracturing in 
shale gas well development (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010).  As a result of 
these environmental concerns, the state of New York ordered a nine-month moratorium 
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on hydraulic fracturing in August 2010 so more data could be collected as to its 
environmental impacts (Honan, 2010). 
This study utilizes data on shale gas developments in Texas, providing an 
interesting context to test the proposed hypotheses.  The first producing gas well drilled 
in Texas was completed in 1872 (Railroad Commission of Texas, 2011).  The annual 
natural gas production in Texas was approximately 7,000 billion cubic feet (bcf) in 2008 
and the number of active wells in 2008 was 96,502.  Importantly, the potential of the 
technologically recoverable reserves in the Barnett shale of Texas is estimated to be 44 
trillion cubic feet (tcf) (Arthur, Langhus, & Alleman, 2008). 
To test robustness, a data sample on shale gas developments in New York was 
also collected.  New York represents a distinct regulatory context from Texas.  The first 
producing gas well drilled in New York was completed in 1821 (New York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation, 2008) and the annual natural gas production 
in New York in 2008 was 50 bcf.  There were 6,675 active wells in New York in 2008.  
More notable, the potential of the technologically recoverable reserves in the Marcellus 
shale is estimated to be 262 tcf (Arthur et al., 2008).  Thus, while Texas has historically 
produced significantly more natural gas than New York, the potential of shale natural gas 
production in New York may be greater than in Texas. 
SAMPLE 
The data sample used to assess the proposed hypotheses was derived from the 
natural gas industry between 1999 and 2009.  It is comprised of all publicly traded natural 
gas firms (SIC: 1311) that existed at the end of 2009 (N=154).  As a result of this 
sampling technique, there are no firm exits in the data sample.  However, there are a 
number of firms that enter the sample at various points during the sample time frame.  
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This should not a concern because in this study I am focused on the relationship between 
the firm’s regulatory environment and its lobbying activity as well as the relationship 
between specific firm variables and lobbying activity.  Therefore, utilizing a sample of 
firms, some of which lobby and some of which do not affords the opportunity to test 
whether such relationships exist.  The full sample includes 1,831 firm-year observations. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The dependent variable for Hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 was the amount a firm 
invested in defensive SPM in Texas.  The dependent variable for Hypotheses 3, 6 and 8 
was the amount a firm invested in offensive SPM in Texas.  Texas lobbying data became 
available starting in 1999 from the Texas Ethics Commission.  To test for robustness, 
New York lobbying data, which became available in 2005 from the New York State 
Commission on Public Integrity, was also used.  To distinguish between defensive and 
offensive SPM, I first assessed whether a firm invested in lobbying in Texas.  Then I 
distinguished between defensive and offensive lobbying by analyzing each firm’s 
lobbying activity report and assessing (a) the issues lobbied upon and (b) specific bills or 
regulations lobbied.  If an issue lobbied upon by the firm pertained to a proposed law or 
regulation that would negatively impact the firm’s ability to explore for natural gas, 
defensive SPM was coded.  If the issue lobbied by the firm pertained to a proposed law or 
regulation that would positively impact the firm, offensive SPM was coded.   
For example, during 2005, a firm in the sample lobbied in Texas on House Bill 
217 which, “Authorized the commissioners’ court of a county with a population of more 
than 3.3 million to regulate sound levels of activities in unincorporated areas of the 
county to promote the public health, safety, or welfare.”  It also “allowed the county to 
prohibit any act that produces a sound that a reasonable person would find objectionable” 
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and “made each hour that a violation continues a separate offense.”  In this example, this 
firm’s investment in SPM was coded as defensive because the Barnett shale development 
is close to the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex and the process of hydraulic fracturing is 
extremely loud.  Thus, should this bill have passed it would have led to increased 
regulatory pressure on natural gas firms developing production in the Barnett shale. 
In contrast, during 2009, a different firm lobbied on Texas House Bill 634 which 
“Directed the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, in consultation with the 
Public Utility Commission, to establish a carbon dioxide "cap and trade" program that 
would limit and then reduce the total carbon dioxide emissions released by electric 
generating facilities in this state.”  Because natural gas is a “cleaner burning” fossil fuel 
than coal, many natural gas producers have attempted to focus attention on the reduced 
CO2 emissions that natural gas generated electricity produces (America’s Natural Gas 
Alliance, 2010), arguing at the same time for increased carbon dioxide regulations.  Thus, 
this investment in SPM was coded as offensive. 
To validate whether I had assessed the negative and positive legislation 
accurately, and hence coded defensive and offensive SPM appropriately, I utilized a third 
party analysis of the legislation provided by the Texas Oil and Gas Association 
(TXOGA).  As part of its Legislative Affairs service TXOGA, the primary trade 
association for the natural gas industry in Texas, provides bill analysis of all legislation 
that would positively or negatively impact oil and gas companies in the state 
(http://www.txoga.org/categories/Legislative-Affairs/Bill-Analysis/).  Comparing my 
independent coding of legislation with the bill analysis performed by TXOGA yielded a 
92% rate of agreement.  For the 8% of the coding that were not in agreement, the 
TXOGA bill analysis was used. 
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A representative sample of this defensive/offensive coding procedure is provided 
in Table 3.  In general, defensive SPM was coded to occur when proposed legislation 
would result in increased costs or increased regulations for firms in the natural gas 
industry.  Defensive SPM was also coded when proposed legislation would result in 
decreased costs or regulations for firms in industries that competed with the natural gas 
industry (e.g., the coal industry).  Finally, defensive SPM was coded when proposed 
legislation would result in the creation of new demand or new market opportunities for 
firms in industries that competed with the natural gas industry (e.g., legislation funding 
clean-coal technology). 
In contrast, offensive SPM was coded to occur when proposed legislation would 
result in decreased costs or decreased regulations for firms in the natural gas industry.  
Offensive SPM was also coded when proposed legislation would result in increased costs 
or regulations for firms in industries that competed with the natural gas industry (e.g., the 
coal industry).  Finally, offensive SPM was coded when proposed legislation would result 
in the creation of new demand or new market opportunities for firms in the natural gas 
industry (e.g., legislation establishing low emissions vehicle standards). 
It is important to note that not all of the legislation on which a firm lobbied could 
be classified as clearly offensive or defensive in nature.  For example, in 2007 House Bill 
1493 was lobbied upon by several firms in my sample.  This legislation called for the 
creation of a regional planning commission to create a storm research center to develop 
plans and programs focused on hurricane response in the Gulf Coast Region.  Because it 
is not clear whether the passage of this bill would have been viewed positively or 
negatively by a firm in the natural gas industry it was coded as “unknown”.  The key 
criteria for the coding of “unknowns” in the sample were that they represented truly 
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ambiguous legislation.  A complete breakdown by year which shows how many bills 
were coded as offensive, defensive and unknown is provided in Table 4. 
Because firms typically lobby on multiple issues and proposed legislation in any 
given year, a count of defensive and offensive SPM actions was tallied for each firm in 
each year in which a lobbying investment was made.  A percentage of defensive SPM 
investment was then calculated by dividing the number of defensive SPM actions by the 
total number of all SPM actions undertaken by each firm in each year.  Similarly, a 
percentage of offensive SPM investment was calculated by dividing the number of 
offensive SPM actions by the total number of all SPM actions for each firm in each year.  
These percentages were then multiplied by the total lobbying investment made by each 
firm in each year to calculate each firm’s defensive and offensive SPM investment.  
These variables were highly skewed to the right, so the log of each was used to produce a 
more normal distribution. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY.  The independent variable for Hypothesis 1 was 
the degree of regulatory uncertainty.  Regulatory uncertainty was calculated by dividing 
the number of Democratic legislators by the number of Republican legislators in the 
Texas House of Representatives and Senate.  A similar measure was created to assess 
robustness in New York.  Given the pro-business leanings of the Republican Party, 
greater numbers of Republican legislators were associated with lower regulatory 
uncertainty, therefore values of less than one represent environments lower in regulatory 
uncertainty while values greater than one represent higher regulatory uncertainty 
environments.  Assessing regulatory uncertainty in this manner is based on the 
methodology described by political scientists who have argued that firms tend to prefer 
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Republicans over Democrats based on ideological grounds (Burris, 1987; Handler & 
Mulkern, 1982).  For Texas, this data was collected using the Legislative Reference 
Library of Texas (http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/).  For New York, this data was collected 
using the New York State Red Book available through the New York State Library. 
It is important to note that I created and experimented with using two variables to 
account for regulatory uncertainty within the state for both branches of government for 
each year.  This type of regulatory uncertainty was assessed in each model.  Ultimately, 
the single variable approach, which assessed regulatory uncertainty by state by averaging 
across the respective House of Representatives (or Assembly in New York) and Senate, 
was chosen.  This measure allowed for the models to preserve the unique state level 
regulatory uncertainty while also simplifying the interpretation of the models. 
UNREALIZED GAINS FROM STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS.  The independent variable 
for Hypothesis 2 was the amount of investment at risk to regulatory changes.  This 
variable was measured as the annual number of permitted shale gas wells in Texas (and 
New York for the robustness check).  Permitted wells represent an investment by the 
natural gas firm as they have paid to lease property on which they intend to drill, have 
received state approval to commence exploration, but have not yet begun the exploration 
process.  This variable was highly skewed to the right, so it was logged to produce a more 
normal distribution. 
SIZE OF ASSET INVENTORY.  The independent variable for Hypothesis 3 was the 
size of the firm’s asset inventory.  This variable was measured as the volume of each 
firm’s natural gas production, in million cubic feet (mcf), from shale formations in the 
state in each year.  This variable was highly skewed to the right, so it was logged to 
establish a more normal distribution. 
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MODERATING VARIABLES 
PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH SPM.  Prior experience with SPM was the moderating 
variable in Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6.  This variable was measured as the count of the 
number of years since each firm began investing in lobbying in each state. 
REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY.  Regulatory uncertainty was the moderating 
variable in Hypotheses 7 and 8.  This variable was measured the same way as described 
above as it was also the independent variable for Hypothesis 1. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
A number of variables were used to control for alternative explanations.  Firm 
size, measured as the log of the number of employees at each firm, and firm slack, 
measured as the log of cash at each firm, have both been hypothesized to affect a firms 
likelihood of engaging in SPM (e.g., Schuler, 1996; Stigler, 1971).  Market share, 
measured as the log of the firm’s total natural gas production in the state was assessed as 
well to control for the possibility that some firms may have been more active in 
developing production in general during the time period of interest. 
ANALYSIS 
Generalized estimating equations (GEEs) were used to analyze the panel data for 
this study.  GEE models are an extension of generalized linear models, which are 
designed to handle longitudinal data (Liang & Zeger, 1986; Lipsitz, Fitzmaurice, Orav & 
Laird, 1994).  GEE models derive maximum likelihood estimates and allow for non-
independent observations.  To define GEE models four components must be specified: 
(1) the dependent variable distribution, (2) a link function, (3) the independent variables, 
and (4) the correlation structure of the repeated measurements.  For all models a Gaussian 
(normal) distribution with an identity link function was used.  The covariance structure of 
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the repeated measurements was specified as autoregressive with one lag (AR1).  
Furthermore, a more conservative approach was employed by estimating the GEE models 
with Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances.  This 
estimation procedure produces covariances that are robust to general heteroscedasticity, 
because variances within a cross-section are allowed to differ across time (White, 1980). 
The dependent variables for all hypotheses turned out to have a substantial zero 
inflation factor, thus there is the possibility that the sample could be biased by the firms 
which make no investment at all in SPM across the window of observation.  In order to 
control for this, a two-stage Heckman procedure was used (Heckman, 1979).  This 
procedure involves the use of an event history model to estimate the likelihood of 
investment in defensive and offensive SPM as a function of the variables which are 
similar to those used in the primary analysis.  For example, while employee count was 
utilized as a control for firm size in the second stage GEE model, log of assets was used 
in the first stage probit model.  Similarly, while cash on hand was used as a measure of 
slack in the second stage GEE model, the log of working capital was utilized in the first 
stage probit model.  Finally, total state natural gas production was used in the first stage 
probit model as a proxy for market share and firm age was also included in the first stage 
probit model. 
The estimated values from these models were transformed to obtain the inverse 
Mills ratio (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003).  This transformation eliminates instabilities 
that can occur if the assumptions underlying the probit model are not met.  This inverse 
Mills ratio was then included as a control in the GEE models. The estimated value for 
firm’s investing in defensive SPM (invmills1) was used as a control for Hypotheses 1, 2, 
4, 5 and 7 (i.e., defensive SPM investment hypotheses).  The estimated value for firm’s 
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investing in offensive SPM (invmills2) was used as a control for Hypotheses 3, 6 and 8 
(i.e., offensive SPM investment hypotheses). 
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Chapter 5: Results 
Data collected and analyzed from U.S. natural gas producers are reported in this 
chapter.  As previously discussed, the focus of this study is on shale natural gas 
production and lobbying in Texas (i.e., the Texas data sample). The Texas natural gas 
industry has been in existence since 1872 (Railroad Commission of Texas, 2011) and 
continues to grow.  According to the Texas Railroad Commission (2011), from 1936 to 
2009, natural gas production in Texas grew nearly 9-fold, from 844 trillion cubic feet 
(Tcf) produced in 1932 to 7,573 Tcf produced in 2009.  During that same time period, the 
number of producing wells increased 37 times, from 2,717 to 101,097.  The Bureau of 
Economic Geology (Kim & Ruppel, 2005) estimated that in 2002 Texas was responsible 
for 30% of total U.S natural gas production.  It further argued that if Texas was its own 
nation, it would rank as one of the top 10 natural gas producers in the world.  Tables 5 
and 6 provide descriptive statistics for the Texas data sample.  Table 5 lists the means and 
standard deviations of key variables assessed.  Table 6 lists the correlations among those 
variables. 
Data on lobbying and natural gas production was also collected for New York.  
New York represents a different institutional context than Texas, so it provides the 
opportunity to check the robustness of the findings from the Texas data sample.  
Information on the robustness checks is presented at the end of this chapter. 
RESULTS FOR TEXAS DATA SAMPLE 
Results associated with lobbying and natural gas production data from Texas are 
presented in the following order.  First, diagnostic analyses dealing with issues of 
multicollinearity are presented.  Second, results from the first stage models (probit 
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models) are presented.  Finally, results from the second stage models (GEE models) are 
discussed. 
DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS: MULTICOLLINEARITY.  Multicollinearity was assessed 
for the Texas data sample using condition indices (Belsley, 1991).  The highest condition 
index was 5.23, well below any problematic value.  To further assess collinearity among 
the independent variables OLS regressions were run to generate Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIFs) for all the variables.  The highest value was 4.93 and the average VIF was 
2.74 well below the recommended cutoff of 10, so multicollinearity does not appear to be 
a concern in the results (Chatterjee, Hadi & Price, 2000; Neter, Kutner, Wasserman, & 
Nachtsheim, 1996).  Table 7 shows the diagnostic analysis for the Texas data sample. 
FIRST-STAGE ANALYSIS.  Tables 8 and 9 displays the first-stage models used to 
estimate the zero-inflation factors associated with a firm’s decision to invest in both 
defensive and offensive SPM in Texas, respectively.  Following Greve (1999), the 
variables used to assess the probability that a firm would invest – at any level -- in either 
defensive or offensive SPM were predictive of those phenomena but theoretically distinct 
from the independent variables in the second-stage models that I used to test my 
hypotheses.  Specifically, the variables used in the first-stage models included firm age, 
firm assets, firm working capital, and total natural gas production in the state of Texas.  
Firm age has been shown to be related to a firm’s likelihood of engaging in SPM 
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994).  Firm assets were used as a proxy for firm size which has 
been shown to be related to a firm’s likelihood of engaging in SPM (Meznar & Nigh, 
1995).  Firm working capital was used as a proxy for slack resources which has also been 
shown to be related to a firm’s likelihood of engaging in SPM (Schuler, 1996).  Finally, 
total natural gas production in the state of Texas was used to quantify the firm’s Texas 
assets which could influence its propensity to engage in SPM. 
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Reviewing the findings in Table 8 shows that firm age was negative and 
significantly related to the firm’s likelihood of investing in defensive SPM.  This finding 
runs counter to prior research which has shown a positive relationship between firm age 
and investment in SPM (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994).  This finding is likely due to the 
fact that younger firms in the sample were also more successful developing natural gas in 
Texas than older firms and hence more likely to engage in lobbying.  Firms in the natural 
gas industry are typically younger than firms in the oil industry because natural gas 
development hasn’t historically been as lucrative as oil development, but it has been 
significantly cheaper.  As a result, in an effort to avoid competing with the oil majors 
(e.g., ExxonMobil, BP, ChevronTexaco) natural gas firms have tended to develop 
regional expertise.  When these firms “hit the jackpot”, they are oftentimes acquired by 
one of the oil majors.   
Consistent with prior research, firm size (Meznar & Nigh, 1995) and firm 
working capital (Schuler, 1996) were positive and significantly related to the firm’s 
likelihood of investing in defensive SPM.  Also, total natural gas production in Texas was 
found to be positive and significantly related to the firm’s likelihood of investing in 
defensive SPM.  These results are mirrored in Table 9 which assessed the likelihood that 
a firm would invest in offensive SPM. 
SECOND-STAGE ANALYSIS OF DEFENSIVE SPM INVESTMENT.  Table 10 shows 
the results of the second-stage analyses in which investment in defensive SPM was the 
independent variable.  Model 1 of Table 10 is the base model consisting only of control 
variables.  Model 2 adds in the hypothesized direct effects influencing a firm’s 
investment in defensive SPM.  Models 3 through 5 add each hypothesized interaction 
individually.  Model 6 then presents the full model including all of the hypothesized 
interactions influencing a firm’s investment in defensive SPM.  To assess whether the 
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impact of adding variables in successive models improved model fit, the quasilikelihood 
under the independence model criterion (QIC) was employed.  Because GEE 
methodology is based on quasi-likelihood theory (Wedderburn 1974), there is no 
assumption made about the distribution of the response observations. Thus, more typical 
model fit criterion, such as -2 log likelihood, cannot be applied.  Per Cui (2007), the 
model with the smallest QIC value should be interpreted as the best-fitting model to the 
data. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that high levels of regulatory uncertainty will be positively 
associated with firm investment in defensive SPM.  Model 2 of Table 10 indicates that 
the association between regulatory uncertainty and investment in defensive SPM is 
positive and significant (b = 0.57, p < 0.05).  Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported.   
Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive association between yet to be realized 
investments by the firm (i.e., investment in horizontal drilling permits) and its investment 
in defensive SPM.  Model 2 of Table 10 indicates that the association between a firm’s 
unrealized gains from its strategic investment in horizontal permits and its investment in 
defensive SPM is negative and not significant (b = -0.23, n.s.).  Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not 
supported.   
Hypothesis 4 predicts a positive interaction between regulatory uncertainty and 
prior experience with SPM and firm investment in defensive SPM.  Model 3 of Table 10 
reports the evidence, indicating a negative and non-significant interaction coefficient (b = 
-0.27, n.s.).  Furthermore, in the full model (Model 6), the coefficient remains negative 
and the interaction remains non-significant (b = -0.24, n.s.).  Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is 
not supported.  Hypothesis 5 predicts a positive interaction effect between yet to be 
realized investments by the firm (i.e., investment in horizontal drilling permits) and prior 
experience with SPM and its investment in defensive SPM.  Model 4 of Table 10 shows 
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that this relationship is negative and non-significant (b = -0.02, n.s.).  Examining the full 
model (Model 6) in Table 10 indicates that this relationship becomes positive but remains 
not significant (b = 0.001, n.s.).  Thus, Hypothesis 5 is not supported.  Finally, 
Hypothesis 7 predicts a positive interaction effect between yet to be realized investments 
by the firm (i.e., investment in horizontal drilling permits) and regulatory uncertainty and 
its investment in defensive SPM.  Model 5 of Table 10 shows that this relationship is 
negative and non-significant (b = -5.20, n.s.) as does the full model (Model 6; b = -5.43, 
n.s.).  Therefore, Hypothesis 7 is not supported. 
SECOND-STAGE ANALYSIS OF OFFENSIVE SPM INVESTMENT.  Table 11 shows 
the results of the analyses in which investment in offensive SPM was the independent 
variable.  Model 7 of Table 11 presents the base model consisting only of control 
variables.  Model 8 adds in the hypothesized direct effects influencing a firm’s 
investment in offensive SPM.  Models 9 and 10 add each hypothesized interaction 
individually.  Model 11 represents the full model including both of the hypothesized 
interactions influencing a firm’s investment in offensive SPM. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive association between the size of a firm’s asset 
inventory and its investment in offensive SPM.  Model 8 of Table 11 indicates that the 
association between the size of a firm’s asset inventory and its investment in offensive 
SPM is positive and significant (b = 0.09, p < 0.01).  Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is 
supported. 
Hypothesis 6 predicts a positive interaction effect between the size of the firm’s 
asset inventory and prior experience with SPM and firm investment in offensive SPM.  
Model 8 of Table 11 indicates a negative and non-significant coefficient (b = -0.01, n.s.).  
Additionally, Model 11 of Table 11 also reports a negative and non-significant 
coefficient (b = -0.02, n.s.).  Thus, Hypothesis 6 is not supported.  Hypothesis 8 predicts a 
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negative interaction effect between the size of the firm’s asset base and regulatory 
uncertainty and firm investment in offensive SPM.  Model 10 of Table 11 shows a 
negative and significant relationship (b = -0.39, p < 0.05).  Model 11 of Table 11 also 
indicates a negative and significant relationship (b = -0.43, p < 0.05).  Therefore 
Hypothesis 8 is supported. 
A number of analyses using alternative measures and functional forms of the 
variables were assessed as a result of the lack of findings of the interaction terms.  In the 
analyses described herein, a firm’s investment in defensive SPM was logged to reduce 
the skewness in the distribution.  However, a non-logged version of this independent 
variable was also used, both with an identity link function and a logged link function in 
the GEE analysis.  In the first case, the model would not achieve convergence.  In the 
second case, the QIC value of all models was much greater than the values presented in 
Tables 10 and 11.  In a separate analysis, lags of the independent variables were used to 
assess the proposed hypotheses.  Again, the QIC values of the resultant models suggested 
a poor fit.  Finally, there was a possibility that a curvilinear relationship may have existed 
between the proposed independent variables and investment in SPM.  Therefore, the 
square of each control variable and independent variable was also analyzed, separately 
and in combination with the other variables.  No curvilinear relationships were found. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK USING NEW YORK DATA SAMPLE 
The method described above was also applied to the NY data sample (N = 784 
firm-year observations) as a robustness check.  While the natural gas industry in New 
York represents a smaller dataset than the Texas data sample, it offers a different 
regulatory context on which to assess the robustness of hypotheses in this study.  Table 
12 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for the New York data sample.  
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Regression results are shown in Tables 13 and 14.  Table 15 contains a summary of the 
results from both the Texas and New York data samples.  
Consistent with the finding from the Texas data sample, Hypothesis 1 was 
confirmed in the New York data sample (Table 13; b = 1.28, p < 0.05).  This robust 
finding suggests that regulatory uncertainty is an important driver of a firm’s investment 
in defensive SPM.  Even across different regulatory contexts, firms appear likely to 
engage in defensive SPM to maintain the status quo when their regulatory environment 
becomes more uncertain. 
Unlike the Texas data sample, Hypothesis 2 was also supported in the New York 
data sample (Table 13; b = 1.81, p < 0.01).  These conflicting findings may be the result 
of the different regulatory contexts.  More specifically, the New York natural gas 
industry between 2004 and 2009 underwent a boom in horizontal permits for shale gas 
development, but the drilling of those wells has lagged.  Thus, a natural gas firm 
operating in New York is likely to have a greater surplus of undrilled horizontal permits 
that it is seeking to protect through investments in defensive SPM than firms in Texas.  
Hypothesis 3 was not supported using the New York data sample (Table 14; b = -
0.28, n.s.) though it was supported using the Texas data sample.  Similar to Hypothesis 2, 
this lack of robust finding is likely the result of the different regulatory contexts 
examined.  For example, firms in Texas had, on average, a much larger asset inventory 
than firms operating in New York.  As a result, firms in New York would have been less 
likely to engage in offensive SPM because they did not have excess asset inventory for 
which they were trying to create increased demand. 
Consistent with the finding in the Texas data sample, Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported in the New York data sample (Table 13; b = -1.64, p < 0.10).  This robust non-
finding suggests that a firm’s prior experience with SPM does not interact with regulatory 
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uncertainty to increase investment in defensive SPM.  In fact, the coefficient was 
negative in both analyses.  This suggests that that a different theoretical mechanism may 
be driving this relationship than the proposed learning effect. 
Unlike in the Texas data sample, Hypothesis 5 was supported in the New York 
data sample (Table 13; b = 5.63, p < 0.01).  Much like the outcome of Hypothesis 2, this 
conflicting finding is likely the result of the different regulatory contexts.  Because a firm 
in New York was more likely to have a greater surplus of undrilled horizontal permits, it 
would likely have sought to protect those investments by engaging in defensive SPM.  
Prior experience with SPM interacted to make this more likely in New York. 
Hypothesis 6 (Table 14; b = -0.17, p < 0.01) was not supported using the New 
York data sample because, while significant, the interaction occurred in the opposite 
direction predicted.  This non-finding is robust across data samples.  Additionally, the 
negative coefficient occurs across both data samples though it is non-significant in the 
Texas data sample (see Table 11).  The smaller number of firms with natural gas 
production in New York may be causing the significant finding.  However, the fact that a 
firm’s prior experience with SPM decreases the likelihood of it investing in offensive 
SPM when it has a larger asset inventory demands further theorizing.   
Similar to Hypothesis 6, Hypothesis 7 (Table 13; b = -0.69, p < 0.01) was not 
supported using the New York data sample because, while significant, the interaction 
occurred in the opposite direction predicted. This non-finding is robust across data 
samples.  Furthermore, the negative coefficient occurs across both data samples though it 
is non-significant in the Texas data sample (see Table 10).  Thus, analysis of both data 
samples suggest that regulatory uncertainty decreases the likelihood of a firm investing in 
defensive SPM when it has yet to be realized investments (i.e., investment in horizontal 
drilling permits). 
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Finally, Hypothesis 8 was not supported using the New York data sample (Table 
14; b = -0.59, n.s.) though it was supported using the Texas data sample (see Table 11).  
This lack of robust finding is likely the result of the different regulatory contexts 
examined.  Again, firms in Texas had, on average, a much larger asset inventory than 
firms operating in New York.  As a result, firms in New York would have been less 
likely to engage in offensive SPM, regardless of the uncertainty in the regulatory 
environment, because they did not have excess asset inventory for which they were trying 
to create increased demand. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Research in strategy has considered several facets of why firms engage in 
strategic political action and has proposed multiple typologies that describe the outcomes 
of such action.  For example, Baysinger (1984) distinguished between domain 
maintenance and domain management, while Oliver and Holzinger (2008) distinguished 
between defensive political strategies and proactive political strategies.  These existing 
typologies have been primarily theoretical though.  This study has endeavored to 
empirically assess the factors influencing when firms would seek to engage in political 
action specifically designed to protect the status quo (e.g., defensive SPM) and political 
action focused on shaping future legislation (e.g., offensive SPM).  The threats and 
opportunities within a firm’s regulatory environment were proposed as the primary 
motivation driving firms to engage in these distinct forms of SPM.  As predicted, when 
firms experienced higher regulatory uncertainty in their political environment, they 
reacted with greater amounts of defensive SPM.  Furthermore, when firms possessed a 
large inventory of assets, they were more likely to engage in offensive SPM.  Regulatory 
uncertainty was also found to negatively moderate the relationship between a firm’s asset 
inventory and its likelihood of investing in offensive SPM suggesting that regulatory 
uncertainty in a firm’s political environment may override its efforts to engage in 
offensive SPM. 
These findings have important implications for strategy research because they 
begin the process of empirically validating a typology of SPM determined by how firm’s 
perceive their environment.  The research presented here contributes theoretically to this 
conversation by identifying specific environmental and organizational conditions under 
which firms would be expected to engage in defensive and offensive SPM. 
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
ENVIRONMENTAL DRIVERS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF SPM.  I found that the 
degree of regulatory uncertainty in a firm’s environment significantly impacts whether it 
invests in defensive SPM (Hypothesis 1).  More specifically, as regulatory uncertainty 
increases so does the likelihood that firms will invest in defensive SPM.  This finding 
was also supported by the robustness check using the New York data sample.  What are 
the implications of this finding?  First, this finding lends support to the importance of 
theoretically differentiating between different types of strategic political management 
based on contextual motivations.  The notion that different types of strategic political 
management exist has been proposed by scholars that study the interaction of business 
and government (Baysinger, 1984; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).  However, despite 
identifying potentially different types of corporate political activity, research has yet to 
consider the conditions under which firms would be expected to engage in one or the 
other.  This finding demonstrates that a specific environmental condition can lead to a 
specific type of strategic political management. 
Second, this finding suggests that when a firm is faced with threats in its political 
environment it is likely to engage in SPM to defend itself.  Strategic categorization theory 
argues that managers perceive threats and opportunities and suggests that firms act in 
specific ways as a result of such perceptions (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 
1988).  Yet research that has employed this theory has implied that firms are likely to 
undertake actions internal to the firm, such as reorganizing divisions and routines to more 
effectively ward off threats or expanding into new product markets to take advantage of 
an opportunity (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001).  This finding suggests that a firm may also 
engage the political environment when faced with threats in attempts to preserve its 
competitive advantage.  This makes sense for a number of reasons.  First, because SPM 
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can be undertaken relatively cheaply (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo & Snyder, 2003), it 
may be high on the list of actions firms take when facing difficulties.  SPM is also 
something that executives are likely to directly influence, perhaps more so and more 
quickly than they can influence other strategic actions such as new product development 
or extensive reorganizations.  Thus, engaging in defensive SPM when a threat occurs in 
the firm’s political environment is likely to be at the forefront of the executive’s minds. 
Third, this finding provides legitimacy for the methodology employed in this 
study which empirically assessed the two types of strategic political management: 
defensive and offensive.  While extant research has theoretically differentiated between 
different types of SPM, empirically this distinction has not been measured.  I devised 
specific ways of measuring offensive and defensive SPM and operationalized those 
measures using state lobbying data to distinguish between them.  Going forward, 
methodologically assessing different types of corporate political activity is likely to be 
important to research in non-market strategy because it will allow strategy scholars to test 
theory that predicts specific types of corporate political action. 
FIRM SPECIFIC DRIVERS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF SPM.  I also argued that there 
should be a positive relationship between the amount a firm had invested in yet to be 
realized gains and the extent of its investment in defensive SPM (Hypothesis 2).  This 
hypothesis was not supported.  This non-finding suggests that firms in Texas that 
invested in horizontal permits to explore for natural gas were no more likely to engage in 
defensive SPM to protect their investment than firms which had not made significant 
investments in horizontal permits.  Considering that the Barnett shale in Texas was 
heavily developed during the time frame of this study the firms operating there that had a 
large inventory of undrilled horizontal permits may not have felt that they were at risk of 
losing their ability to develop those permits.  More generally, firms that have invested in 
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yet to be realized gains may not perceive defensive SPM as a viable mechanism to 
protect those investments. 
Additionally, I argued that there would be a positive relationship between the size 
of a firm’s asset inventory and the extent of its investment in offensive SPM (Hypothesis 
3).  This hypothesis was supported.  Employing a similar logic as was used to understand 
Hypothesis 2 helps to understand this finding.  Firms in Texas substantially increased the 
volume of shale gas produced during the sampling window.  As a result, these firms were 
likely to have a surplus of gas for which they were seeking additional demand 
opportunities.  Hence these firms were more likely to engage in offensive lobbying in an 
effort to create new markets in natural gas vehicles and increase demand for natural gas 
in electricity generation.   
THE MODERATING ROLE OF EXPERIENCE WITH SPM.  A firm’s prior experience 
with SPM was argued to increase the likelihood that it would engage in defensive or 
offensive SPM.  Indeed, the main effect of prior experience with SPM on investment in 
both defensive and offensive SPM was found to be positive and significant.  However, 
prior experience with SPM did not have the predicted moderating effects on the degree of 
regulatory uncertainty in a firm’s political environment, its amount of investment in yet 
to be realized gains, or the size of its asset inventory. 
More specifically, I argued that prior experience with SPM would positively 
moderate the relationship between the degree of regulatory uncertainty and the extent of 
investment in defensive SPM (Hypothesis 4).  This non-finding could be the result of the 
fact that firms primarily engage in defensive SPM rather than offensive SPM and 
experience with SPM plays only a minor role in motivating a firm to engage in defensive 
SPM when regulatory uncertainty is high.  In other words, high levels of regulatory 
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uncertainty may trigger a defensive SPM response, regardless of how much experience a 
firm has had utilizing SPM. 
I also argued that prior experience with SPM would positively moderate the 
relationship between the amount a firm had invested in yet to be realized gains and the 
extent of its investment in defensive SPM (Hypothesis 5).  Similar to the finding for 
Hypothesis 2, in Hypothesis 5 we see that firms in Texas with significant numbers of 
horizontal permits were no more likely to engage in defensive SPM, whether or not they 
had previous experience utilizing it.  Once again, the sample of Texas firms used in this 
study likely influenced this non-finding as these firms may not have perceived any risk of 
losing their undrilled horizontal permits. 
Additionally, I argued that prior experience with SPM would positively moderate 
the relationship between the size of a firm’s underutilized asset base and the extent of its 
investment in offensive SPM (Hypothesis 6).  The fact that a firm’s prior experience with 
SPM does not interact with the quantity of shale gas produced is troubling, as investment 
in offensive SPM was argued to be more likely for those firms that had gained experience 
with SPM.  This non-finding with the Texas data sample brings into question whether 
and how firms learn to engage in offensive SPM.  Digging more deeply into this question 
will be an important future research direction as I try to uncover whether engaging in 
offensive SPM is a learned strategy. 
More generally, the pattern of non-findings associated with the moderating effects 
of prior experience with SPM, taken in combination with the positive and significant 
main effect, suggests that prior experience may lead organizations to learn about and 
undertake greater amounts of SPM, but that the conditions presented by environmental 
and firm specific characteristics overwhelms such learning.  Indeed, it may be that when 
firms are faced with the specific conditions tested in this study they understand how to 
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respond using SPM.  This may entail firms understanding when not to engage in SPM.  In 
other words, it may be that prior experience with SPM helps firms learn that in certain 
circumstances, SPM will not provide a benefit and therefore investment in SPM is 
unaltered. 
THE MODERATING ROLE OF REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY.  I argued that higher 
levels of regulatory uncertainty would positively moderate the relationship between the 
amount a firm had invested in yet to be realized gains and the extent of its investment in 
defensive SPM (Hypothesis 7).  This hypothesis was not supported.  The rationale for this 
hypothesis was that firms which had invested in horizontal permits but had not yet 
received a return on that investment would be even more likely to engage in defensive 
SPM when regulatory uncertainty was high.  Not only was this not the case, the 
coefficient for this hypothesized interaction was negative.  Thus this finding suggests that 
regulatory uncertainty may negatively moderate the relationship between the amount a 
firm had invested in yet to be realized gains and the extent of its investment in defensive 
SPM.   
Finally, I argued that higher levels of regulatory uncertainty would negatively 
moderate the relationship between the size of a firm’s asset inventory and the extent of its 
investment in offensive SPM (Hypothesis 8).  This hypothesis was supported which 
suggests that firms utilize SPM first and foremost to manage the regulatory uncertainty in 
their environment.  This finding is important as it suggests that a hierarchy may exist in 
which firms primarily engage in defensive SPM to manage their environment and seek to 
engage in offensive SPM more selectively when specific opportunities may exist.  A 
future research direction, based on this result, would be to dig deeper into this proposed 
hierarchy in attempts to confirm it and determine when it may not hold. 
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CONCLUSIONS.  Overall, the pattern of findings in this study seem to suggest a 
number of underlying mechanisms may be influencing what motivates firms to engage in 
SPM and whether that SPM is defensive or offensive in nature.  First, regulatory 
uncertainty more so than any other variable appears to influence whether a firm engages 
in SPM.  This finding was robust across multiple regulatory contexts.  More over, firms 
appear to respond to such uncertainty with SPM designed to protect the status quo.  So 
strong is the effect of regulatory uncertainty on firms, it seems to decrease the likelihood 
that a firm would invest in offensive SPM even if its asset position would indicate that it 
should.  Thus, one key conclusion that can be drawn from the results is that firms are 
much more likely to respond to regulatory uncertainty with defensive SPM regardless of 
the regulatory context in which they operate or the firm specific assets under control. 
Second, the overall lack of support for the proposed firm specific hypotheses that 
would drive defensive and offensive SPM suggests that more work is required to 
understand the key firm level drivers of SPM.  While firms with a significant inventory of 
unused assets were found to invest in offensive SPM, this finding was not robust across 
both regulatory contexts.  There could be a number of reasons for these null results: (a) 
the theory applied might be faulty, (b) the measures employed could be problematic, (c) 
the empirical setting might be causing problems, or (d) the analysis itself might be an 
issue.  It is also possible that more than one of these issues could be at play at the same 
time. 
Strategic categorization theory was employed to derive the proposed hypotheses 
in this study.  Based on existing research which has considered how firms respond to 
uncertainty in their environment this appeared to be the most appropriate lens through 
which to build my arguments.  Furthermore, a series of interviews undertaken prior to 
this study with individuals that worked at the intersection of business and politics 
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suggested that firms engage in SPM in a fashion similar to that described by this theory.  
Hence, while other theoretical mechanisms could certainly be at work here, I believe that 
the proposed theory represents one of the stronger aspects of this research. 
A number of firm specific measures were used to assess the proposed hypotheses 
and the construct validity of these measures could be a driver of the null results.  For 
example, using permitted but undrilled wells as a proxy for unrealized gains from 
strategic investments may not have fully captured the risk of a firm losing a key 
investment.  This is because most natural gas firms tend to have a fairly diversified 
inventory of drilling permits so losing the opportunity to drill a specific shale gas well 
may not have caused too much of a problem for a firm operating in multiple locations and 
drilling into a variety of producing formations.  Furthermore, the cost of any one permit 
is not extremely high so the firms in the sample may not have been motivated to engage 
in defensive SPM.  Another example of a potentially problematic variable was the 
operationalization of prior experience with SPM using a simple count of years engaged in 
lobbying.  This measure treated as equal the amount a firm invested in lobbying in 
previous years by simply counting whether an investment was made or not.  However, a 
$1,000,000 lobbying investment is substantially different from a $5,000 lobbying 
investment and this discrepancy needs to be accounted for in the measure.  Thus, going 
forward, more detailed measures will be constructed to try to more accurately assess the 
firm specific independent variables. 
Additionally, the empirical setting appears to have had significant influence on 
when and how firms engaged in SPM.  Considering how the abovementioned firm 
specific hypotheses varied in support across Texas and New York, there is reason to 
believe that regulatory context may be an important underlying driver affecting firm 
specific decisions to engage in defensive and offensive SPM.  Indeed, a number of firms 
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in the Texas data sample also operated in New York during the time frame of this study 
and appeared to undertake completely different political strategies.  Thus, research will 
need to closely consider the effects of the empirical setting on how firms strategically 
engage in corporate political activity. 
Finally, Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) models were used in the analysis 
of the data in this study.  These models were run as a second stage model after a first 
stage probit analysis was performed to assess whether zero-inflation was an issue.  The 
GEE models were run using a logged-link function, assuming a normal distribution and 
an AR1 (autoregressive 1-year lag) within subject correlation structure.  A large number 
of other models were also run to assess the best model fit before settling on these 
parameters for the GEE.  Furthermore, a VIF analysis was run on the variables in these 
models and no issues of multicollinearity were found to exist.  While it is possible that 
the analysis could be driving the null results in this study, I believe that is less likely than 
the issues of construct validity and the empirical setting studied. 
LIMITATIONS 
This paper begins the process of empirically assessing defensive and offensive 
SPM and as such embodies some limitations which should be addressed.  First, and more 
generally, the primary findings from this study are based on a single industry in one 
institutional context (i.e., the natural gas industry in Texas).  Moving forward research 
should consider extending the context of study beyond the political actions of a single 
industry in one state.  The natural gas industry examined herein provides a context that 
has experienced varying levels of regulatory uncertainty over the sample window.  
However, when the same hypotheses were assessed using a secondary institutional 
context (i.e., New York), the results were not very robust.  On one hand, the New York 
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results should be taken with a grain of salt because the sample size (N = 784 firm-year 
observations) was quite small.  On the other hand, these differing results should be 
further studied by scholars investigating multiple industries under different levels of 
regulatory uncertainty.  This would allow researchers to disentangle potential effects that 
a specific industry’s regulatory structure and the regulatory uncertainty surrounding that 
structure may have on each other. 
Second, regulatory uncertainty was determined based on the composition of 
Democrats and Republicans in the House of Representatives and the Senate in Texas.  
This variable was assessed by combining the count of Democrats and Republicans in 
both legislative branches across the term of the sample.  The measure infers that 
Democrats are more likely to propose anti-business legislation than Republicans and thus 
firms would perceive a legislature comprised of more Democrats as more uncertain.  This 
measure is based on extant research (Burris, 1987; Handler & Mulkern, 1982).  However, 
not all firms may perceive regulatory uncertainty in this way.  For example, firms may 
perceive greater levels of uncertainty associated with newly elected congressional 
representatives with which they are unfamiliar.  Additionally, some scholars have 
suggested that firms are more likely to make political contributions to whomever they 
believe has the best chance of winning an election (e.g., Burris, 1987) and this study does 
not control for political contributions made by firms.  Therefore, additional research that 
employs the type of regulatory uncertainty measures used in this study would help to 
strengthen its interpretation. 
Third, offensive and defensive SPM was determined in this study based on 
lobbying disclosure reports from the firms in the sample.  Firms which engage directly in 
lobbying or contract with an outside firm to lobby on their behalf must submit disclosure 
reports.  While firms submit these disclosures on an annual basis, they do not always 
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complete them in the same way.  As a result, I was only able to assess offensive and 
defensive SPM for firms which specified the legislation on which they lobbied and for 
which there was a clear interpretation of how the firm would interpret that legislation.  
While this is a limitation of the underlying lobbying data, it does create the possibility 
that not all of the issues lobbied upon by the firms which filed disclosure reports were 
represented in the dataset. 
Finally, this research places a black box around a firm’s perception of threats and 
opportunities in its regulatory environment.  It implies that an uncertain regulatory 
environment would be perceived as a threat to a firm’s operations and that opportunity to 
shape legislation may exist for those firms which have prior experience engaging in SPM.  
Because firm perceptions are not directly measured, executives may have formed 
impressions that differ from those suggested here.  That said, through a series of 
ethnographic interviews with individuals that work at the interface of business and 
government (e.g., lobbyists, government affairs executives) it became apparent that firms 
do perceive threats and opportunities in their political environment.  Furthermore, 
uncertainty in a firm’s regulatory environment was explicitly mentioned in multiple 
interviews as a potential threat to firm operations and experience with SPM was noted as 
an important driver of the level of sophistication of a firm’s strategy to engage in political 
activity. 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Looking ahead, research at the intersection of business and government has the 
opportunity to make a considerable impact on the field of strategic management.  The 
firm’s non-market environment presents a unique arena for competition and opportunities 
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for firms to gain competitive advantage.  It also presents fertile ground to expand upon 
existing theories in strategy and organizational theory.   
Based on the findings from this study, one future research directions will 
endeavor to build upon the distinction between defensive and offensive SPM.  The 
methodology developed in this study allows for data to be collected and analyzed on a 
number of different levels: federal, state and county/city.  Examining the 
defensive/offensive distinction across multiple levels will provide an understanding of 
how firms engage in political activity to maximize preferred outcomes.  For instance, a 
firm which feels threatened may seek to “amplify” legislative and regulatory outcomes 
that would be beneficial to its industry by investing in lobbying at all levels of 
government.  In contrast, when seeking unique firm specific legislative and regulatory 
outcomes, firms may seek to more quietly propose policy at a specific level of 
government that could benefit the firm and may generate a unique competitive advantage.  
This differential political amplification strategy may be able to be teased apart by 
examining the same issues across firms lobbying at multiple levels of government. 
Another opportunity to explore this defensive/offensive distinction resides at the 
intersection of corporate lobbying and corporate political action committee (PAC) 
contributions.  Research has considered how lobbying behavior interacts with PAC 
contributions (e.g., Tripathi, Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2002).  However, research has yet 
to consider how PAC contributions interact with defensive and offensive lobbying.  
Considering corporate PAC contributions in conjunction with defensive or offensive 
lobbying investment offers the opportunity to examine whether firms make such 
contributions to strategically strengthen lobbying efforts.  Exploring this relationship may 
also offer insight into how a firms overall corporate political activity works with its 
various market strategies to gain competitive advantage. 
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As a result of the recent Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission 
Supreme Court ruling in January 2010, firms are now able to make unlimited political 
contributions that focus on the election and/or defeat of specific candidates.  This ruling 
has already had dramatic effects on the 2010 mid-term elections.  For example, The 
Center for Responsive Politics found that independent outside expenditures increased 
from $156 million in the 2008 mid-term election to $210 million in the 2010 mid-term 
election cycle (opensecrets.org, 2010).  As corporations continue to engage in ever 
increasing levels of political activity, it is imperative that the research community 








Authors (year) Perspective Type Conclusion/Main Finding 
Baron (1995) Political Economics Theory Corporate political activity can be conceptualized as 
complements and substitutes to a firms more traditional 
market strategy. 
Baumgartner & Leech (1998) Political Science Theory Public policy is the outcome of competition among interest 
groups. 
Baysinger (1984) Strategy Theory Firms engage in corporate political activity in an effort to 
shape public policy in favorable ways. 
Becker (1983) Political Economics Theory Favorable policy outcomes are the result of the level of 
pressure applied by industry on a specific issue. 
Boddewyn & Brewer (1994) Strategy Theory Larger firms are more politically active and firm size is a key 
antecedent to political activity. 62  Broadbent (2000) Political Science Empirical Dense networks among business, labor and government 
officials are more likely to create policy consensus. 
Burris (2001) Organizational Theory Empirical Managers are more likely to make political contributions to 
preferred candidates while firms are more likely to make 
political contributions to incumbents. 
Caeldries (1996) Political Economics Empirical The intent of legislation is to transfer favors to firms that are 
demanded by the industry. 
Cook & Barry (1995) Strategy Empirical The cognitive orientation of managers influences the extent 
to which firms engage in corporate political activity. 
Epstein (1969) Political Science Theory Industry represents a collective of firms that operate together 
to secure benefits. 
Epstein (1980) Political Science Theory Firms operate collectively as a social class to secure their 
own interests. 
Francis (1993) Political Science Theory Firms should be thought of as a unique social class focused 




Authors (year) Perspective Type Conclusion/Main Finding 
Getz (1997) Political Science Theory Industry represents a collective class of firms driven to 
optimize policy outcomes. 
Gray & Lowery (1996) Political Science Theory Competition between interest groups positively impacts the 
likelihood that a firm will engage in political activity. 
Hansen & Mitchell (2000) Political Economics Empirical Firm sales is positively related to a firm’s likelihood of 
investing in  
Hart (2001) Political Science Empirical A firm’s dependency on government for revenues is an 
important antecedent driving how it engages in political 
activity. 
Hart (2004) Political Science Theory Firms should not be characterized as an interest group 
because they are economically motivated and composed of 
workers who are compensated. 
Hersch & McDougall (2000) Political Science Empirical A firm’s political activity is influenced by the political 
activity of its rivals. 
Hillman (2005) Strategy Empirical Firms that are more heavily regulated are more likely to have 
former politicians on their Board of Directors. 
Hillman & Hitt (1999) Strategy Theory The type of corporate political activity taken by a firm is 
dependent upon whether it takes a relational or transactional 
approach to government. 
Kaufman, Englander & Marcus 
(1993) 
Strategy Theory Firms engage in political activity as a way to reduce costs 
associated with operations. 
Keim & Baysinger (1988) Strategy Empirical Larger firms are more politically active and firm size is a key 
antecedent to political activity. 
Keim & Zeithaml (1986) Strategy Theory Firms engage in political activity as a way to secure 
government inaction over a specific issue. 
Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi & 
Cannella (2008) 
Strategy Empirical An individual’s breadth and depth of government experience 
is related to their likelihood of being appointed to a resource 
dependent firms’ board of directors. 




Authors (year) Perspective Type Conclusion/Main Finding 
across policy characteristics. 
Martin (1995) Political Science Empirical Formalized structures, such as a firm’s Washington, D.C. 
office, facilitate corporate political activity by merging key 
individuals and resources. 
Meznar & Nigh (1995) Strategy/Organizational 
Theory 
Empirical Firm size and slack resources are key antecedents to political 
activity. 
Mizruchi (1992) Organizational Theory Empirical Formal and informal networks bind elites from business and 
government together. 
Oliver (1991) Organizational Theory Theory Under certain circumstances firms may engage in political 
influence tactics to alter institutional pressures to conform in 
ways that would not be beneficial to the firm. 
Oliver & Holzinger (2008) Strategy Theory The effectiveness of a firm’s political activity is related to the 
dynamic political capabilities that reside within it. 
Olson (1965) Political Science Theory Collective action theory suggests that it will be less costly for 
firms to be politically active in concentrated industries. 
Oster (1982) Political Economics Theory Firms represent a coalition of interests which seek 
governmental favors. 
Peltzman (1976) Political Economics Theory Firms will not always prevail over unorganized interests due 
to the fact that regulators are motivated to design regulation 
that protects the consumers which vote for them. 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) Organizational Theory Theory Firms engage in political activity to manage their dependence 
on the government for key resources. 
Salamon & Seigfried (1977) Political Science Empirical Firm size is positively related to corporate political activity 
across a number of industries. 
Salisbury (1984) Political Science Theory Large institutions can be expected to dominate the political 
process, motivated primarily to manage trouble of threats 
encountered. 
Schuler (1996) Strategy Empirical Large firms dominate political activity to protect their 




Authors (year) Perspective Type Conclusion/Main Finding 
Schuler & Rehbein (1997) Theory Empirical Firms gauge their political activity based on the salience of 
proposed policy on their competitive position. 
Schuler, Rehbein & Cramer 
(2002) 
Strategy Empirical Industry concentration, industry political activity and industry 
congressional caucuses influence the degree to which firms 
engage in multiple forms of political activity. 
Stigler (1971) Political Economics Theory Any industry with sufficient power will attempt to capture the 
state and obtain governmental favors. 
Truman (1951) Political Science Theory Firms are more likely to engage in political activity when 
they are threatened. 
Ungson, James & Spicer (1985) Strategy Empirical Regulatory agencies are perceived by firms as uncontrollable 
and influence firm goal setting and planning. 
Useem (1984) Organizational Theory Theory Formal and informal networks bind elites from business and 
government together. 
Vogel (1996) Strategy Theory The importance of political issues to a firm are likely to drive 
its engagement in political activity. 
Yoffie (1987) Strategy Theory Firms engage in political activity as a way to reduce the 






Baysinger, B. D.  1984.  Domain Maintenance as an Objective of Business Political Activity: An Expanded Typology.  Academy of 
Management Review, 9(2): 248-258. 
 Domain Management: to gain special monetary and anticompetitive favors from government at the expense of other firms or 
interests.  It is a strategic response to environmental uncertainty in which the organization attempts to employ governmental 
entities as instruments of organizational effectiveness. This objective may be pursued privately, collusively, or with the aid of 
governmental entities.  Political tactics are developed and implemented to induce governmental organizations to use their power 
on behalf of the firm.  This treats the relationship between governmental entities and business firms as basically cooperative. 
 Domain Defense: to manage environmental turbulence created by governmental threats to the legitimacy of organizational goals 
and purposes.  This turbulence often arises in areas in which organizational objectives or decisions adversely affect societal third 
parties. These individuals or groups, in turn, express their concerns regarding the legitimacy of the organization or its behavior, 
often through the expedient of seeking government action.  Domain defense comprises a set of business political activities, the 
objective of which is to counteract such challenges to the legitimacy of business organizations' goals and purposes, as opposed to 
its methods of pursuing them. 
 Domain Maintenance: to manage threats to the methods by which organizations pursue their goals and purposes.  Domain 
maintenance is a parallel political objective to domain defense. The latter focuses on threats to the legitimacy of organizational 
goals and purposes; the former focuses on similar threats to the legitimacy of organizational methods, regardless of the perceived 
legitimacy of its goals and purposes. 
Boddewyn, J. J., & Brewer, T. L. 1994.  International-business political behavior: New theoretical directions.  Academy of 
Management Review, 19(1): 119-143. 
 Nonbargaining Political Behavior: Firms not engaging the government 
 Compliance and Avoidance: may be viewed as two sides of the same coin. Sovereign governments present obstacles and 
incentives to cost efficient and market-effective strategies and operations. This situation reflects a hierarchical-authority 
view of business-government relations by emphasizing the formal source of governmental power as something that is 
inherent in official positions (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984). The government as sovereign has the monopoly of legitimate 
power, whereas international companies have only delegated power as an institutionalized privilege resulting from 
permission to enter and operate in a country.  Many international trading and investing firms are satisfied with the 
requirements imposed or their incentives offered by home and host governments, and they simply comply with them 
  
 
because (a) they do not unduly constrain business strategies and operations, (b) they provide attractive benefits (e.g., tax 
deferrals and holidays), or (c) they are uncontrollable by a particular firm. 
 Circumvention: circumvention through illegal activities (e.g., trade smuggling [Stephens, Boddewyn, & Sproul, 1991] and 
using local "front men" to disguise real investment control) provides another nonbargaining form of political response, 
although the there may be legitimacy costs to bear if government detects such behaviors. 
 Bargaining Political Behavior: Firms engaging the government 
 Conflict: In a conflictual context, governments attempt to appropriate the rents resulting from IB operations, whereas 
international firms try to reappropriate these gains (= reaction) or to generate new ones (= proaction), almost as in a zero-
sum game. 
 Partnership Intensity: the partnership type of bargaining behavior rests on a positive-sum-game view of business-
government interactions. Besides, it is characterized by a shift (a) from spot transactions to futures relationships, (b) from 
conflict to cooperation—collaborative governance in Boisot's (1986) and Ouchi's (1980) terminology, (c) from dependence 
to interdependence, and (d) from opportunism to trust (Gambetta, 1988). 
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Meznar, M. B., & Nigh, D.  1995.  Buffer of bridge? Environmental and organizational determinants of public affairs activities in 
American firms.  Academy of Management Journal, 38(4): 975-995. 
 Buffering Strategy: involves trying to keep the environment from interfering with internal operations and trying to influence the 
external environment.  It implies that a firm is trying either to insulate itself from external interference or to actively influence its 
environment through such means as contributions to political action committees, lobbying, and advocacy advertising.  By 
buffering, a firm either resists environmental change or tries to control it. 
 Bridging Strategy: occurs as firms seek to adapt organizational activities so that they conform with external expectations.  It 
implies that the firm actively tries to meet and exceed regulatory requirements in its industry or that it attempts to quickly identify 
changing social expectations in order to promote organizational conformance to those expectations.  By bridging, firms promote 
internal adaptation to changing external circumstances.   
 Buffering and bridging are not mutually exclusive strategies and both are found to occur with increasing environmental 
uncertainty. 
Oliver, C., & Holzinger, I.  2008.  The effectiveness of strategic political management: A dynamic capabilities framework.  Academy 
of Management Review, 33(3): 496-520. 
 Compliance Strategies: firm-level actions undertaken in conformity with political requirements and expectations for the purpose of 
maintaining or creating value by anticipating or adapting to public policy. 
 Reactive Political Strategy: actions undertaken to efficiently align one’s internal processes with political demands (e.g., 
  
 
rapid, low cost reconfiguration of internal processes to meet political demands; investment in training, resource, and skill 
innovations to accelerate and improve compliance with public policy). 
 Anticipatory Political Strategy: actions undertaken to gain a first mover advantage by anticipating future public policy 
(e.g., continuous investment in environmental scanning; hiring ex-government experts; training and investment in 
knowledge of impending public policy changes). 
 Influence Strategies: firm-level actions undertaken for the purpose of mobilizing support for a firm’s interests. 
 Defensive Political Strategy: actions undertaken to thwart unwanted political changes and protect the status quo (e.g., 
advocacy of entry restrictions; activating social networks to defend current public policies; lobbying to reduce the threat of 
substitutes; lobbying to maintain protective pricing structures). 
 Proactive Political Strategy: actions undertaken to shape and control the way norms and public policies are defined (e.g., 
aggressive constituency building to create shared norms; cooperation with governments to create new rules; alliance 
formation to change the rules of political compliance). 
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Weidenbaum, M.  1980.  Public policy: No longer a spectator sport for business.  Journal of Business Strategy, 3(4): 46-53. 
 Passive Reaction: a reactive strategy in which firms make no attempt to play a role in policy formulation or implementation, rather 
they react only post hoc to new legislation. 
 Positive Anticipation: a more active stance towards public policy but still does not include participation in process, rather it refers 
to factoring government policy into the planning process of a firm.  Firms attempt to anticipate future regulations and make 
adjustments accordingly to their strategies, thereby turning regulations into business opportunities. 
 Public Policy Shaping: entails proactive behavior undertaken by firms to achieve specific political objectives. 
Yoffie, D. 1987.  Corporate strategy for political action: a rational model.  In A. Marcus, A. Kaufman, & D. Beam (Eds.), Business 
strategy and public policy: 92-111.  New York: Quorum. 
 The Free Rider: collective action theory suggests that given nearly perfect information, firms would be expected to free ride and 
enjoy the benefits of the collective actions of others.  Firms are expected to free ride when (a) political issues have low salience 
and (b) resources that can be committed to political action are limited.  80%-90% of firms are expected to free ride. 
 Followers: firms that do not take the lead in collective organizations.  Followers engage in SPM because they (a) perceive 
significant marginal benefit, (b) estimate low marginal costs, and (c) estimate a low supply of collective benefits.  
 Organizing or Leading: firms that hold a dominant position in the industry and therefore a disproportionately large stake in an 
industry’s politics could calculate that the individual benefit to organizing a collective effort could outweigh the costs.  This 
suggests that market share would be an indicator of SPM investment.  Firms acting in a leadership capacity would be expected to 





thought to become more difficult when there is uncertainty about future regulations and whether they will differentially affect 
firms within the industry. 
 Private Goods: a strategy which seeks legislation, court decisions, regulations, executive orders, or other government assistance 
conferring unique benefits to an individual company.  Large and monopolistic firms are expected to try to undertake this strategy, 
but due to public disclosure, one firm gaining unique benefits from government is unusual. 
 Political Entrepreneur: a firm using limited resources to mobilize as hoc coalitions or other companies and individuals with an eye 
towards securing access to key decision makers for the firm, but without the costs and risks of a private goods strategy and without 





State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
TX 79th (2005-2006) HB 170 Required site-specific air quality 
monitoring after an excessive 
emissions event at a oil or gas well 
to protect the health of individuals in 
the affected community 
Defensive Would lead to cost 
increases for gas 







TX 79th (2005-2006) HB 217 Authorized the commissioners’ 
court of a county with a population 
of more than 3.3 million to regulate 
sound levels of activities in 
unincorporated areas of the county 
to promote the public health, safety, 
or welfare. Allowed the county to 
prohibit any act that produces a 
sound that a reasonable person 
would find objectionable. Made 
each hour that a violation continues 
a separate offense. 












State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
TX 79th (2005-2006) SB 123 Authorized Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to 
require in a near nonattainment area 
any air quality control measure the 
commission may require in a 
nonattainment area if both the 
participating county and the largest 
municipality in that county request 
the measure as part of an early 
action plan. 
Defensive Would lead to 
increase air 
quality regulations 
at drill site, 
depending on its 





TX 80th (2007-2008) HB 176 Authorized the commissioners’ 
court of a county with a population 
of more than 3.3 million to regulate 
sound levels of activities in 
unincorporated areas of the county 
to promote the public health, safety, 
or welfare. Allowed the county to 
prohibit any act that produces a 
sound that a reasonable person 
would find objectionable. Made 
each hour that a violation continues 
a separate offense. 












State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
TX 80th (2007-2008) HB 269 Established a new legislative goal 
that each electric utility provide 
incentives sufficient for retail 
electric providers and competitive 
energy service providers to acquire 
additional cost-effective energy 
efficiency (to allow customers to 
reduce energy consumption, peak 
demand, or energy costs) equivalent 
to at least 50% (rather than the 
current 10%) of the electric utility's 
annual growth in demand. 




facilities to meet 
this legislative 
goal and thus 
increases demand 







TX 80th (2007-2008) HB 270 Imposed a 7.5% tax on the market 
value of coal used in the state, with 
the proceeds dedicated only to 
provide funding for new energy 
technology grants.  Provided that a 
process of providing energy that the 
committee determines significantly 
reduces greenhouse gas emissions, 
has minimal risk to public health and 
the environment, and is sustainable 
and efficient is considered new 
energy technology. Made nuclear 
fission energy ineligible for a new 
energy technology grant. 
Offensive Would make the 





















State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
TX 80th (2007-2008) HB 344 Required TCEQ to implement a 
low-emission vehicle program, for 
motor vehicles with a model year of 
2009 or later, that is consistent with 
Phase II of the California Low-
Emission Vehicle program. 
Offensive Would increase 
the demand for 
natural gas 
vehicles and thus 
create another 








State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
TX 80th (2007-2008) HB 375 Required the State Energy 
Conservation Office by October 1, 
2008 to recommend - to the 
governor, the lieutenant governor, 
the speaker of the house of 
representatives, and the standing 
committees of the legislature with 
primary jurisdiction over 
environmental, economic, and 
transportation matters - a coherent 
strategy and mechanisms for 
increasing the availability of low-
emission automotive fuels.  
Required the State Energy 
Conservation Office to analyze the 
life cycle emissions for each 
recommended fuel and determine 
how well the fuel achieves the goal 
of producing at least 20 percent less 
emissions over its life cycle than 
conventional gasoline. Provided that 
the analysis is to include reduction 
in carbon dioxide emissions if part 
of the fuel's production process 
includes carbon capture and storage. 
Offensive Would increase 
the demand for 
natural gas 
vehicles and thus 
create another 








State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
TX 80th (2007-2008) HB 440 Required TCEQ to adopt new 
screening levels for air contaminants 
that take into account all acute and 
chronic health effects on a person 
due to exposure to an air 
contaminant.  Defined a condition of 
air pollution to exist if sufficient and 
credible evidence demonstrates an 
unacceptable risk of health effects 
due to air pollution as determined by 
an exceedance of the screening level 
for an air contaminant for a relevant 
period as provided by commission 
rule.  Placed the burden on the 
owner or operator of the facility or 
source, if TCEQ brings an action for 
creation of a condition of air 
pollution, to demonstrate to the 
Commission through certification by 
a responsible official that the facility 
or source is in compliance with all 
technological and monitoring 
requirements. 
Defensive Would lead to cost 
increases as a 
result of penalties 








State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
TX 81st (2009-2010) HB 290 Directed the TCEQ, in making a 
finding as to whether emissions 
from a facility for which a permit 
application is under consideration 
will contravene the intent of the 
Texas Clean Air Act (including 
protection of the public's health and 
physical property), TCEQ was to 
consider the cumulative effects on 
the public's health and physical 
property of expected air contaminant 
emissions from the facility. 
Defensive Would lead to 
increased costs 
associated with 
the time required 








State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
TX 81st (2009-2010) HB 323 Required the owner or operator of 
any source of a discharge of 
pollutants into any water in the state 
that is an industrial user or a 
publicly owned treatment works to 
use a gas chromatograph or other 
means specified by TCEQ to sample 
any discharges from the industrial 
facility or treatment works for 
purposes of detecting an 
unauthorized discharge of waste and 
promptly notify TCEQ of any such 
unauthorized discharge detected. 
Provided that the facility owner or 
operator must obtain TCEQ 
approval before replacing or 
upgrading the gas chromatograph or 
other means used in detecting an 
unauthorized discharge of waste. 
Defensive Would lead to 
increase costs 
associated with 








TX 81st (2009-2010) HB 395 Repealed a legislative goal that 50 
percent of the megawatts of 
generating capacity installed in this 
state after January 1, 2000, use 
natural gas, that such usage be 
labeled as “green” together with 
related requirements for the Public 
Utility Commission to establish 
programs (including the natural gas 
energy credits program) and adopt 
rules to accomplish this goal. 
Defensive Would reduce the 
possibility that 
future natural gas 
cogeneration 
facilities would be 
built and calls into 
question the 
“green” label 









State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
TX 81st (2009-2010) HB 469 Defined a "clean energy project" as 
a project to construct a coal-fired 
electric generating facility that will 
have a capacity of at least 200 
megawatts, use integrated 
gasification combined cycle 
technology, and be capable of 
capturing and permanently 
sequestering in a geologic formation 
at least 60 percent of the carbon 
dioxide resulting from the 
generation of electricity by the 
facility. 














TX 81st (2009-2010) HB 634 Directed the TCEQ, in consultation 
with the Public Utility Commission, 
to establish a carbon dioxide "cap 
and trade" program that would limit 
and then reduce the total carbon 
dioxide emissions released by 
electric generating facilities in this 
state. 

















State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
TX 81st (2009-2010) SB 119 Required the TCEQ to adopt rules to 
implement a low-emission vehicle 
program for motor vehicles with a 
model year of 2012 or later that is 
consistent with the California Low-
Emission Vehicle program. 
Offensive Would increase 
the demand for 
natural gas 
vehicles and thus 
create another 





TX 81st (2009-2010) SB 273 Required an applicant to the TCEQ 
for a permit for an injection well 
that, for a charge, will dispose of 
industrial or municipal waste to use 
on-site monitoring wells to monitor 
and analyze groundwater quality and 
to conduct shallow soil test in 
accordance with rules adopted by 
TCEQ.  Required the holder of a 
permit for an injection well 
requiring on-site monitoring wells 
and soil testing to submit to TCEQ a 
report of groundwater and soil 
quality on a regular schedule as 
required by TCEQ rules and 
immediately when a change in 
quality is detected. 
Defensive Would increase 
costs associated 
with natural gas 
exploration due to 
multiple wells 










State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
NY 228th (2005) A 5179 Directed the public service 
commission to adopt rules and 
regulations requiring electric 
corporations to develop and utilize 
clean energy technologies which 
annually reduce the pollution 
generated; established fines for 
failure to comply with such rules 
and regulations; such provisions 
shall apply to the power authority of 
the state of New York and the Long 
Island power authority. 

















NY 229th (2006) A 645 Established a natural gas and oil 
well security fund to enable natural 
gas and oil producers to meet the 
financial security requirements in 
the environmental conservation law 
for the permitting, operation, 
maintenance and plugging of natural 
gas and oil wells. 












State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
NY 229th (2006) S 815 Re-imposed the natural gas company 
tax which expired on September 1, 
2005 for privilege of engaging in 
business, doing business, employing 
capital, owning or leasing property, 
or maintaining an office in this state; 
applied to natural gas companies; 
provided for exemptions including 
for residential purposes and for 
utility credit or reimbursement. 
Defensive Would lead to 
increased costs 
associated with 





NY 230th (2007) A 1092 Directed the department of 
environmental conservation to 
promulgate standards for emission 
of regulated air contaminants from 
certain generating sources; specified 
criteria therefore; provided for a 
permitting requirement and an 
alternative permitting mechanism 
involving a registration process. 
Defensive Would lead to 
increase air 
quality regulations 
at drill site 
Increased 
regulation 
NY 231st (2008) A 11606 Prohibited the use of toxic “fracing” 
solutions during hydraulic 
fracturing. 













State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
NY 231st (2008) A 11527 Established a two-year moratorium 
on the issuance of permits for the 
drilling of new wells and directed 
the department of environmental 
conservation to study the need for 
environmental protection related to 
the drilling of oil and gas. 
Defensive Would slow the 
ability of natural 




NY 232nd (2009) A 1322 Established a moratorium on the 
issuance of permits for the drilling 
of wells and prohibited drilling 
within ten miles of the New York 
city water supply infrastructure. 
Defensive Would stop the 
ability of natural 
gas firms to drill 




NY 232nd (2009) A 3657 Related to the New York state oil, 
natural gas and solution mining 
advisory board (see description in 
text above). 
Defensive Would lead to 
increased 
regulation of 
natural gas drillers 
as a result of the 
advisory board 
having the ability 





NY 232nd (2009) A 8784 Required permit holders to test 
groundwater prior to and after 
drilling wells for oil and natural gas. 
Defensive Would increase 
costs and time to 
explore for natural 










State Session Proposed Bill Proposed Issue SPM Coding Coding Rationale Category 
NY 232nd (2009) S 1111 Required the commissioner of 
environmental conservation to 
promulgate rules and regulations 
implementing reductions in 
emissions of carbon dioxide by 
major electric generating facilities 
(see description in text above). 















NY 232nd (2009) S 2997 Related to the protection of water 
supplies; required an oil and gas 
driller or producer who affects a 
public or private potable water 
supply to restore or replace such 
water supply. 
Defensive Would increase 
costs associated 
with natural gas 
exploration that 







Year Defensive Offensive Unknown Total 
1999 18 0 3 21 
2000 22 1 4 27 
2001 29 2 2 33 
2002 30 8 6 44 
2003 30 14 5 49 
2004 40 19 11 70 
2005 53 31 16 100 
2006 54 32 14 100 
2007 62 41 11 114 
2008 71 53 23 147 





 Mean S.D. Min Max 
Investment in Defensive SPM (log) 1.04 3.23 0.00 12.84 
Investment in Offensive SPM (log) 0.77 2.75 0.00 12.15 
Firm Age (log) 3.03 0.98 0.00 4.91 
Firm Size (log employees) 0.54 0.88 0.00 4.06 
Firm Size (log assets) 5.92 2.77 0.00 12.09 
Cash (log) 2.53 2.11 -0.01 9.29 
Working Capital (log) 1.56 2.18 -3.22 9.27 
Natural Gas Production (log) 6.06 7.62 0.00 20.38 
Size of Asset Inventory (log) 1.40 4.51 0.00 20.21 
Unrealized Gains from Strategic Investments (log) 0.15 0.8 0.00 6.73 
Regulatory Uncertainty 0.80 0.14 0.67 1.01 
Prior Experience with SPM (log) 0.42 1.59 0.00 10.00 
invmills 2.62 1.22 0.35 5.32 




 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Investment in Defensive SPM (log) 1           
2. Investment in Offensive SPM (log) 0.86 1          
3. Firm Age (log) 0.11 0.10 1         
4. Firm Size (log employees) 0.43 0.35 0.30 1        
5. Firm Size (log assets) 0.41 0.36 0.22 0.74 1       
6. Cash (log) 0.39 0.36 0.26 0.72 0.76 1      
7. Working Capital (log) 0.23 0.24 0.13 0.34 0.38 0.58 1     
8. Natural Gas Production (log) 0.34 0.31 0.12 0.17 0.39 0.17 0.06 1    
9. Size of Asset Inventory (log) 0.49 0.45 0.09 0.17 0.34 0.19 0.10 0.49 1   
10. Unrealized Gains from Strat. Invest. (log) -0.02 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.03 -0.05 1  
11. Regulatory Uncertainty 0.32 0.35 0.04 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.09 0.31 0.69 -0.10 1 86  12. Prior Experience with SPM (log) 0.77 0.82 0.12 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.24 0.34 0.45 -0.10 0.35 
13. invmills -0.43 -0.38 -0.08 -0.63 -0.95 -0.69 -0.39 -0.61 -0.41 0.13 -0.27
14. invmills2 -0.44 -0.39 -0.11 -0.63 -0.95 -0.70 -0.43 -0.63 -0.41 0.13 -0.28
            
 12 13 14         
13. invmills -0.40 1          






Variable VIF Sqrt. VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
Firm Size (log employees) 2.46 1.57 0.4060 0.5940 
Cash (log) 3.01 1.73 0.3325 0.6675 
Size of Asset Inventory (log) 2.47 1.57 0.4049 0.5951 
Unrealized Gains from Strat. Invest. (log) 1.99 1.41 0.5025 0.4975 
Regulatory Uncertainty 1.07 1.03 0.9364 0.0636 
Prior Experience with SPM (log) 1.56 1.25 0.6431 0.3569 
invmills 4.38 2.09 0.2281 0.7719 
invmills2 4.93 2.22 0.2028 0.7972 








 Invmills Model 
  
Firm Age (log) -0.195** 
 (0.068) 
Firm Size (log assets) 0.413** 
 (0.04) 
Working Capital (log) 0.060** 
 (0.022) 







** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 





 Invmills2 Model 
  
Firm Age (log) -0.139+ 
 (0.074) 
Firm Size (log assets) 0.359** 
 (0.041) 
Working Capital (log) 0.085** 
 (0.023) 







** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 





 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Firm Size (log employees) 1.09* 0.61+ 0.61+ 0.61+ 0.62+ 0.62+ 
 (0.49) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
Cash (log) 0.02 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Size of Asset Inventory (log) 0.22** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 0.19** 0.19** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Prior Experience with SPM (log)  1.01** 1.22** 1.04** 1.04** 0.85 
  (0.11) (0.44) (0.13) (0.11) (0.56) 
Regulatory Uncertainty (H1)  0.57* 0.63** 0.58* 0.71* 0.66** 
  (0.26) (0.22) (0.26) (0.30) (0.22) 
Unrealized Gains from Strat. Invest. (log) (H2)  -0.23 -0.24 -0.15 3.52 3.67 90    (0.25) (0.25) (0.41) (2.50) (2.89) 
Regulatory Uncertainty*SPM Experience (H4)   -0.27   -0.24 
   (0.54)   (0.66) 
Unrealized Gains*SPM Experience (H5)    -0.02  0.001 
    (0.05)  (0.06) 
Unrealized Gains*Regulatory Uncertainty (H7)     -5.20 -5.43 
     (3.59) (4.34) 
invmills -0.30* -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Constant 1.04+ -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 
 (0.57) (0.43) (0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) 
       
QIC 9233.11 5184.01 5199.63 5159.87 5236.46 5229.73 




 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Firm Size (log employees) 0.48 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.32) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
Cash (log) 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Unrealized Gains from Strat. Invest. (log) 0.37 -0.09 -0.03 -0.22 -0.16 
 (0.42) (0.26) (0.27) (0.30) (0.30) 
Prior Experience with SPM (log)  1.22** 1.31** 1.20** 1.31** 
  (0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) 
Regulatory Uncertainty  -0.64+ -0.64+ -0.14 -0.11 
  (0.33) (0.34) (0.18) (0.18) 
91 
Size of Asset Inventory (log) (H3)  0.09** 0.11** 0.42* 0.47* 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.17) (-0.183) 
Size of Asset Inventory*SPM Experience (H6)   -0.01  -0.02 
   (0.01)  (0.01) 
Size of Asset Inventory*Regulatory Uncertainty (H8)    -0.39* -0.43* 
    (0.18) (0.19) 
invmills2 -0.55** -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 
 (0.18) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 1.90** 0.77* 0.70* 0.42 0.3 
 (0.64) (0.34) (0.33) (0.28) (0.27) 
      
QIC 8297.01 3313.04 3254.37 3284.93 3207.75 




 Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Invest. in Defensive SPM (log) 0.41 2.06 0.00 12.51 1        
2. Invest. in Offensive SPM (log) 0.14 1.14 0.00 10.61 0.61 1       
3. Firm Age (log) 3.06 0.96 0.00 4.91 0.20 0.09 1      
4. Firm Size (log employees) 0.54 0.85 0.00 3.75 0.36 0.25 0.31 1     
5. Firm Size (log assets) 6.31 2.65 0.00 12.09 0.27 0.16 0.18 0.74 1    
6. Cash (log) 2.79 2.15 -0.01 9.29 0.26 0.15 0.25 0.69 0.72 1   
7. Working Capital (log) 1.86 2.29 -3.15 9.27 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.32 0.34 0.59 1  
8. Natural Gas Production (log) 0.42 2.31 0.00 17.53 0.34 0.25 0.03 0.14 0.22 0.12 0.01 1 
9. Size of Asset Inventory (log) 0.09 0.89 0.00 10.10 0.19 0.20 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.55 
10. Unreal. Gains/Strat. Invest. (log) 0.03 0.27 0.00 3.76 0.41 0.28 0.03 0.15 0.17 0.13 -0.02 0.74 
92 
11. Regulatory Uncertainty 1.64 0.11 1.41 1.78 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.01 
12. Prior Experience with SPM (log) 0.08 0.47 0.00 4.00 0.78 0.66 0.17 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.05 0.34 
13. invmills 3.15 1.07 0.55 6.31 -0.35 -0.20 -0.77 -0.65 -0.73 -0.58 -0.20 -0.36 
14. invmills2 3.04 0.63 1.37 4.64 -0.34 -0.20 -0.49 -0.71 -0.91 -0.62 -0.11 -0.33 
             
 Mean S.D. Min Max 9 10 11 12 13 14   
9. Size of Asset Inventory (log) 0.09 0.89 0.00 10.1 1        
10. Unreal. Gains/Strat. Invest. (log) 0.03 0.27 0.00 3.76 0.34 1       
11. Regulatory Uncertainty 1.64 0.11 1.41 1.78 0.06 0.01 1      
12. Prior Experience with SPM (log) 0.08 0.47 0.00 4.00 0.32 0.41 0.12 1     
13. invmills 3.15 1.07 0.55 6.31 -0.22 -0.27 -0.08 -0.31 1    






 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Firm Size (log employees) 0.52+ 0.52+ 0.47+ 0.52+ 0.51+ 0.46+ 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) 
Cash (log) 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Size of Asset Inventory (log) 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.15 
 (0.30) (0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.26) (0.19) 
Prior Experience with SPM (log)  0.69** 3.81+ 0.79** 0.65** 3.82* 
  (0.14) (1.96) (0.17) (0.13) (1.81) 
Regulatory Uncertainty (H1)  1.28* 1.28* 1.29* 1.26* 1.23* 
  (0.61) (0.60) (0.61) (0.62) (0.60) 
93 
Unrealized Gains from Strat. Invest. (log) (H2)  1.81** 1.69** 2.16** 0.50 -6.29** 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (1.24) (2.40) 
Regulatory Uncertainty*SPM Experience (H4)   -1.66   -1.64+ 
   (1.03)   (0.94) 
Unrealized Gains*SPM Experience (H5)    0.21**  5.63** 
    (0.03)  (1.56) 
Unrealized Gains*Regulatory Uncertainty (H7)     -0.80 -0.69** 
     (0.68) (0.13) 
invmills -0.15 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.06 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Constant 0.51 -2.43+ -2.33+ -2.42+ -2.41+ -2.18+ 
 (0.47) (1.27) (1.22) (1.27) (1.29) (1.19) 
       
QIC 2984.88 2131.20 1935.08 2041.73 2161.41 1859.71 




 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Firm Size (log employees) 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.13 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Cash (log) 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Unrealized Gains from Strat. Invest. (log) 0.80 0.31 0.78 0.48 0.82+ 
 (0.67) (0.69) (0.51) (0.68) (0.50) 
Prior Experience with SPM (log)  1.18* 1.22* 1.17* 1.22* 
  (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) 
Regulatory Uncertainty  0.37 0.39+ 0.41+ 0.40+ 
  (0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.24) 
94 
Size of Asset Inventory (log) (H3)  -0.28 -0.07 2.03 0.91 
  (0.22) (0.10) (1.68) (1.32) 
Size of Asset Inventory*SPM Experience (H6)   -0.18**  -0.17** 
   (0.05)  (0.06) 
Size of Asset Inventory*Regulatory Uncertainty (H8)    -1.37 -0.59 
    (1.11) (0.80) 
invmills2 0.03 0.07 0.12* 0.07 0.12* 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Constant -0.18 -0.87+ -1.09* -0.96+ -1.11* 
 (0.35) (0.46) (0.52) (0.53) (0.55) 
      
QIC 1058.12 757.92 801.93 776.65 811.28 




Hypothesis # Hypothesis  Texas Data Sample  New York Data Sample 
(Robustness Check) 
1 There will be a positive relationship 
between the degree of regulatory 
uncertainty and the extent of investment in 
defensive SPM. 
Supported Supported 
2 There will be a positive relationship 
between the amount a firm has invested in 
yet to be realized gains and the extent of its 
investment in defensive SPM. 
Not Supported Supported 
3 There will be a positive relationship 
between the size of a firm’s asset inventory 
and the extent of its investment in offensive 
SPM. 
Supported Not Supported 
95 
4 Prior experience with SPM will positively 
moderate the relationship between the 
degree of regulatory uncertainty and the 
extent of investment in defensive SPM. 
Not Supported Not Supported 
5 Prior experience with SPM will positively 
moderate the relationship between the 
amount a firm has invested in yet to be 
realized gains and the extent of its 
investment in defensive SPM. 
Not Supported Supported 
6 Prior experience with SPM will positively 
moderate the relationship between the size 
of a firm’s underutilized asset base and the 
extent of its investment in offensive SPM. 





7 Higher levels of regulatory uncertainty will 
positively moderate the relationship 
between the amount a firm has invested in 
yet to be realized gains and the extent of its 
investment in defensive SPM. 
Not Supported Not Supported 
8 Higher levels of regulatory uncertainty will 
negatively moderate the relationship 
between the size of a firm’s underutilized 
asset base and the extent of its investment in 
offensive SPM. 











































Alexander, R. M., Scholz, S., & Mazza, S.  Forthcoming.  Lobbying ROI: An empirical 
analysis under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.  Journal of Law and 
Politics. 
Allison, G. T.  1969.  Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis.  American 
Political Science Review, 63: 689–718. 
America’s Natural Gas Alliance.  2010.  Clean & Efficient.  http://www.anga.us/learn-
the-facts/power-generation/clean--efficient. 
Ansolabehere, S., de Figueiredo, J.M., & Snyder, J.M.  2003.  Why is there so little 
money in U.S. politics?  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17: 105–30. 
Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J. M., & Tripathi, M.  2002.  Are PAC contributions and 
lobbying linked? New evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act.  Business 
and Politics, 4: 131–155. 
Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C.  1985.  The psychology of sunk cost.  Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes.  35: 124–140. 
Arthur, J. D., Langhus, B., & Alleman, D.  2008.  An Overview of Modern Shale Gas 
Development in the United States.  ALL Consulting. 
Barney, J. B.  1991.  Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage.  Journal of 
Management, 17: 99–120. 
Baron, D.  1995.  The nonmarket strategy system.  Sloan Management Review, 37(1): 
73–86. 
Baumgartner, F. R., & Leech, B. L.  1998.  Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups 
in Politics and Political Science.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Baysinger, B. D.  1984.  Domain maintenance as an objective of business political 
activity: An expanded typology.  Academy of Management Review, 9: 248–258. 
Becker, G. S. 1983.  A theory of competition among pressure groups for political 
influence.  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 : 371–400. 
Belsley, D. A.  1991.  Conditioning Diagnostics.  Wiley–Interscience: New York. 
Billings, R. S., Milburn, T. W., & Schaalman, M. L.  A model of crisis perception: A 




Boddewyn, J., & Brewer, T.  1994.  International business political behavior: New 
theoretical directions.  Academy of Management Review, 19: 119–143. 
Bonardi, J.-P., Hillman, A. J., & Keim, G. D.  2005.  The attractiveness of political 
markets: Implications for firm strategy.  Academy of Management Review, 30: 
397–413. 
Broadbent, J.  2000.  Social capital and labor politics in Japan: Cooperation or 
cooptation?  Policy Sciences, 33: 307–321. 
Burgelman, R. A.  1983.  A process model of internal corporate venturing in the 
diversified major firm.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 28: 223–244. 
Burris, V.  1987.  The political partisanship of American business: a study of corporate 
political action committees.  American Sociological Review, 52:732–744. 
Burris, V.  2001.  The two faces of capital: Corporations and individual capitalists as 
political actors.  American Sociological Review, 66: 361–381. 
Caeldries, F.  1996.  The institutional embeddedness of strategy: Predation through 
legislation (or, see you in court).  In J. A. C. Baum, & J. E. Dutton (Eds.), 
Advances in Strategic Management, (13): 215–246.  Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Chatterjee, S., Hadi, A., & Price, B.  2000.  Regression Analysis by Example.  New 
York: Wiley. 
Chattopadhyay, P., Glick, W. H., & Huber, G. P.  2001.  Organizational actions in 
response to threats and opportunities.  Academy of Management Journal, 44: 
937–955. 
Congressional Quarterly.  2009.  "House panel approves bill to aid disposal of unwanted 
electronics.  March 25. 
Cook, R., & Barry, D.  1995.  Shaping the external environment: A study of small firms’ 
attempts to influence public policy.  Business & Society, 34: 317–344. 
Cui, J.  2007.  QIC program and model selection in GEE analyses.  Stata Journal, 7: 
209–220. 
de Figueiredo, J. M., & Silverman, B.  2006.  Academic earmarks and the returns to 
lobbying. Journal of Law and Economics, 49: 597–626. 
DiMaggio, P. J.  1983.  State expansion and organizational fields.  In R.H. Hall & R.E. 
Quinn (Eds.), Organizational Theory and Public Policy: 147–161.  Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
 100
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W.  1983.  The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields.  American 
Sociological Review, 48: 147–160. 
Dutton, J. E., & Jackson, S. E.  1987.  Categorizing strategic issues: Links to 
organizational action.  Academy of Management Review, 12, 76-90. 
Environmental Protection Agency.  2010.  EPA initiates hydraulic fracturing study: 
Agency seeks input from Science Advisory Board.  March 18. 
Epstein, E. M.  1969.  The Corporation in American Politics.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
Epstein, E. M.  1980.  Business political activity: Research approaches and analytical 
issues.  Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 2: 1–55. 
Fligstein, N.  1987.  The Intraorganizational Power Struggle: The Rise of Finance 
Presidents in Large Corporations.  American Sociological Review, 52: 44–58. 
Francis, J. G.  1993.  The Politics of Regulation: A Comparative Perspective.  Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell. 
Freeman, R. E.  1984.  Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach.  Boston, MA: 
Pitman. 
Getz, K. A.  1993.  Selecting corporate political tactics.  In B. M. Mitnick (Ed.), 
Corporate political agency: The construction of competition in public affairs. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Getz, K.  1997.  Research in corporate political action: Integration and assessment.  
Business & Society, 36: 32–77. 
Gray, V., & Lowery, D.  1996.  The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: 
Lobbying Communities in the American States.  Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Greve, H.  1999.  The effect of core changes on performance: Inertia and regression 
towards the mean.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 44: 590–614. 
Hambrick, D.C., & MacMillan, I.C.  1985.  Efficiency of product R&D in business units: 
The role of strategic context.  Academy of Management Journal, 28: 527–547. 
Hamilton, B. H., & Nickerson, J. A.  2003.  Correcting for endogeneity in strategic 
management research.  Strategic Organization, 1: 51–78. 
 
 101
Handler, E., & Mulkern, J. R.  1982.  Business in Politics: Campaign Strategies of 
Corporate Political Action Committees.  Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Hansen, W. L., & Mitchell, N. J.  2000.  Disaggregating and explaining corporate 
political activity: Domestic and foreign corporations in national politics.  
American Political Science Review, 94: 891–903. 
Hart, D. M.  2001.  Why do some firms give? Why do some firms give a lot?: High-Tech 
PACs, 1977–1996.  Journal of Politics, 63: 1230–1249. 
Hart, D. M.  2004.  “Business” is not an interest group: On the study of companies in 
American national politics.  Annual Review of Political Science, 7: 47–69. 
Heckman, J. J.  1979.  Sample selection bias as a specification error.  Econometrica, 47: 
153–161. 
Hersch, P., & McDougall, G.  2000.  Determinants of automobile PAC contributions to 
house incumbents: Own versus rival effects.  Public Choice, 104(3–4): 329–343. 
Hillman, A.  2003.  Determinants of political strategies in US multinationals.  Business 
& Society, 42: 455–484. 
Hillman, A. J.  2005.  Politicians on the board of directors: Do connections affect the 
bottom line?  Journal of Management, 31: 464–481. 
Hillman, A. J., & Hitt, M. A.  1999.  Corporate political strategy formulation: A model of 
approach, participation, and strategy decisions.  Academy of Management 
Review, 24: 825–842. 
Hillman, A. J., Keim, G. D., & Schuler, D.  2004.  Corporate political activity: A review 
and research agenda.  Journal of Management, 30: 837–857. 
Honan, E.  2010.  New York Senate passes gas drilling moratorium.  Reuters New 
Service (August 4). 
Jackson, S. E., & Dutton, J. E.  1988.  Discerning threats and opportunities.  
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33: 370–387. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A.  1979.  Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47: 263–291. 
Kaufman, A., Englander, E., & Marcus, A.  1993.  Selecting and organizational structure 
for implementing issues management: A transaction costs and agency theory 




Keim, G., & Baysinger, B.  1988.  The efficacy of business political activity: Competitive 
considerations in a principal agent context.  Journal of Management, 14: 163–
180. 
Keim, G., & Zeithaml, C.  1986.  Corporate political strategies and legislative decision-
making: A review and contingency approach.  Academy of Management Review, 
11: 828–843. 
Kim, E. M., & Ruppel, S. C.  2005.  Oil and Gas Production in Texas.  Austin, TX: 
Bureau of Economic Geology. 
Kogut, B.  1988.  Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives.  Strategic 
Management Journal, 9: 319–332. 
Kukalis S.  1991.  Determinants of strategic planning systems in large organizations: a 
contingency approach.  Journal of Management Studies, 28: 143–160. 
Lester, R. H., Hillman, A., Zardkoohi, A., & Cannella, A. A.  2008.  Former government 
officials as outside directors: the role of human and social capital.  Academy of 
Management Journal, 51: 999–1013. 
Levitt, B., & March, J. G.  1988.  Organizational learning.  Annual Review of Sociology, 
14: 319–340. 
Liang, K., & Zeger, S. L.  1986.  Longitudinal data analysis using generalized linear 
models. Biometrika, 73: 13–22. 
Lipsitz, S. R., Fitzmaurice, G. M., Orav, E. J., & Laird, N. M.  1994.  Performance of 
generalized estimating equations in practical situations. Biometrics, 50: 270–278. 
Lowi, T. J.  1969.  The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public 
Authority. New York: Norton. 
Marcus, A.  1981.  Policy uncertainty and technological innovation.  Academy of 
Management Review, 6: 443–448. 
Martin, C.  1995.  Nature or nurture? Sources of firm preference for National Health 
Reform.  American Political Science Review, 89: 898–913. 
McGrath, R. G.  1997.  A real options logic for initiating technology positioning 
investments.  Academy of Management Review, 22: 974–996. 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B.  1977.  Institutional organizations: Formal structure as myth 
and ceremony.  American Journal of Sociology, 80: 340–363. 
 
 103
Meznar, M., & Nigh, D.  1995.  Buffer or bridge? Environmental and organizational 
determinants of public affairs activities in American firms.  Academy of 
Management Journal, 38: 975–996. 
Milliken, F. J.  1987.  Three types of perceived uncertainty about the environment: State, 
effect, and response uncertainty.  Academy of Management Review, 12: 133–143. 
Mintzberg, H., Raisinghani, D., & Theoret, A.  1976.  The structure of "unstructured" 
decision processes.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 21: 246–275. 
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J.  1997.  Towards a theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really matters.  
Academy of Management Review, 22: 853–886. 
Mizruchi, M. S.  1992.  The Structure of Corporate Political Action: Interfirm 
Relations and their Consequences.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Moran, P., & Ghoshal, S.  1999.  Markets, firms, and the process of economic 
development. Academy of Management Review, 24: 390–412. 
Neter, J., Kutner, M. H., Wasserman, W., & Nachtsheim, C. J.  1996.  Applied Linear 
Regression Models.  Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
New York Department of Conservation.  2008.  Oil and Gas Drilling in New York State.  
August 29. 
North, D. C.  1990.  Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Nutt, P. C.  1984.  Types of organizational decision processes.  Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 29: 414–450. 
Oliver, C.  1991.  Strategic responses to institutional processes.  Academy of 
Management Review, 16: 145–179. 
Oliver, C., & Holzinger, I.  2008.  The effectiveness of strategic political management: A 
dynamic capabilities framework.  Academy of Management Review, 33: 496–
520. 
Olson, M.  1965.  The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press. 




Oster, S. M.  1982.  The strategic use of regulatory investment by industry sub-groups.  
Economic Inquiry, 20: 604–618. 
Peltzman, S.  1976.  Toward a more general theory of regulation.  Journal of Law and 
Economics, 19: 211–240. 
Penrose, E. T.  1959.  The Theory of the Growth of the Firm.  New York: John Wiley 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R.  1978.  The External Control of Organizations: A 
Resource Dependence Perspective.  New York: Harper & Row. 
Railroad Commission of Texas.  2011.  Chronological Listing of Key Events in the 
History of the Railroad Commission of Texas (1866-1939).  
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about/history/chronological/chronhistory01.php. 
Roberts, E.  1991.  Entrepreneurs in High Technology: Lessons from MIT and Beyond.  
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Salamon, L. M., & Siegfried, J. J.  1977.  Economic power and political influence: 
Impact of industry structure on public-policy.  American Political Science 
Review, 71: 1026–1043. 
Salisbury, R. H.  1984.  Interest representation: The dominance of institutions.  American 
Political Science Review, 78: 64–76. 
Schuler, D.  1996.  Corporate political strategy and foreign competition: The case of the 
steel industry.  Academy of Management Journal, 39: 720–737. 
Schuler, D.  1999.  Corporate political action: Rethinking the economic and 
organizational influences. Business and Politics, 1: 83–97. 
Schuler, D., & Rehbein, K.  1997.  The filtering role of the firm in corporate political 
involvement.  Business & Society, 36: 116–139. 
Schuler, D. A., Rehbein, K., & Cramer, R. D.  2002.  Pursuing strategic advantage 
through political means: A multivariate approach.  Academy of Management 
Journal, 45: 659–672. 
Scott, W. R.  1983.  Health care organizations in the 1980s: The convergence of public 
and professional control systems.  In J.W. Meyer & R. Scott (Eds.), 
Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality, pp. 99–113.  Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage. 
Scott, W. R.  1987.  Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems.  (2nd ed.) 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
 105
Shaffer, B.  1995.  Firm-level responses to government regulation: Theoretical and 
research approaches.  Journal of Management, 21: 495–514. 
Shane, S.  2000.  Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Organization Science, 11: 448–469. 
Staw, B. M.  1976.  Knee deep in the big muddy: A study of escalating commitment to a 
course of action.  Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16: 27–
44. 
Staw, B. M., Sandelands, L., & Dutton, J. E.  1981.  Threat-rigidity cycles in 
organizational behavior: A multi-level analysis.  Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 26: 501–524. 
Stigler, G.  1971.  The theory of economic regulation.  The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science, 2: 3–21. 
Teece, D. J.  1980.  Economics of scope and the scope of the enterprise.  Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 1: 223–247. 
Teece, D. J.  1982.  Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm.  Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 3: 39–63. 
Thompson, J. D.  1967.  Organizations in Action.  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Truman, D. B.  1951.  The Governmental Process.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Ungson, G. R., James, C., & Spicer, B. H.  1985.  The effects of regulatory agencies on 
organizations in wood products and high technology electronics industries. 
Academy of Management Journal, 28: 426–445. 
Useem, M.  1984.  The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Political 
Activity in the U.S. and the U.K.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Venkataraman, S.  1997.  The distinctive domain of entrepreneurship research: and 
editor’s perspective.  In Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm Emergence, and 
Growth.  J. Katz, R. Brockhaus (Eds.).  Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Wedderburn, R. W. M.  1974.  Quasi-likelihood functions, generalized linear models, and 
the Gauss-Newton method.  Biometrika, 61, 439–447. 
Weidenbaum, M.  1980.  Public policy: No longer a spectator sport for business.  
Journal of Business Strategy, 3: 46–53. 
 
 106
White, H.  1980.  A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test or heteroskedasticity.  Econometrica, 48: 817–838. 
Vogel, D.  1996.  The study of business and politics.  California Management Review, 
38: 146–165. 
Yoffie, D. B.  1987.  Corporate strategies for political action: A rational model.  In A. A. 
Marcus, A. M. Kaufman, & D. R. Beam (Eds.), Business Strategy and Public 
Policy: Perspectives from Business and Academia: 43–60.  New York: Quorum. 
 
